Mastering Res Judicata: The True Evidentiary Value of Prior Judgments

Introduction

The administration of justice does not end merely with the pronouncement of a judgment. An equally important question is whether, and to what extent, that judgment should continue to influence subsequent proceedings. A judicial system that permits every concluded dispute to be reopened indefinitely would undermine not only judicial efficiency but also the certainty and stability that law is expected to provide.

It is in this context that the doctrine of res judicata assumes significance. Literally meaning “a matter adjudicated,” res judicata rests on the fundamental proposition that a dispute which has been finally determined by a competent court should not ordinarily be permitted to be litigated repeatedly between the same parties.

Yet, res judicata is not synonymous with the mere existence of a previous judgment. The law draws a careful distinction between the procedural bar against re-litigation and the evidentiary relevance of a previous judicial decision. A judgment may be relevant in subsequent proceedings without necessarily operating as res judicata. Conversely, certain judgments particularly judgments concerning legal status may possess a much wider effect than an ordinary adjudication between private parties.

This distinction becomes particularly important in understanding judgments in rem and judgments in personam.

A judgment in personam ordinarily determines rights and liabilities between the parties before the court. A judgment in rem, on the other hand, is concerned with the status of a person or thing and, where the law so provides, operates with a legal effect extending beyond the immediate 

litigants. The distinction is not merely semantic. It determines who may be bound by a judgment, whether a subsequent court may reopen the issue, and what evidentiary weight the earlier decision carries.

The statutory scheme concerning previous judgments has also undergone an important transition. The law relating to the relevancy of previous judgments has undergone a statutory transition with the enactment of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (‘BSA’), which replaced the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Under the erstwhile Indian Evidence Act, the relevancy of previous judgments was principally addressed under Sections 40 to 44.

The corresponding provisions under the BSA are contained in Sections 34 to 38, which deal respectively with previous judgments relevant to barring a subsequent suit or trial, judgments in rem, judgments relating to matters of public nature, other judgments, and circumstances in which the effect of a judgment may be challenged on grounds such as fraud, collusion or want of jurisdiction

This article examines the relationship between res judicata and the law of evidence, analyses the distinction between judgments in rem and in personam, and explores how Indian courts have approached the finality and evidentiary value of previous adjudications.

1. Res Judicata: The Principle Behind Judicial Finality

Res judicata is fundamentally a doctrine of finality.

Its underlying rationale is that litigation must eventually come to an end. If parties were permitted to repeatedly bring the same dispute before different courts or at successive stages of litigation, the judicial process would become incapable of providing meaningful resolution.

The Supreme Court explained this principle in Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, emphasising that the doctrine is founded upon the need to give finality to judicial decisions. 

Once a matter has been adjudicated, the same parties should not ordinarily be permitted to reopen the issue at a subsequent stage of the same litigation or in subsequent proceedings.

The principle serves several interconnected purposes. It protects litigants from repeated harassment, prevents inconsistent judicial determinations, conserves judicial resources and preserves public confidence in the authority of courts.

However, res judicata is not simply a rule that says “an earlier judgment exists, therefore the matter is closed.” Its application depends upon specific legal requirements.

Under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a matter must have been directly and substantially in issue in the former proceeding, the former proceeding must have been between the same parties or persons claiming under them, the parties must have litigated under the same title, the earlier court must have been competent to decide the matter, and the matter must have been heard and finally decided.

Therefore, the doctrine is concerned not merely with what a court said previously, but with the legal identity and finality of the adjudication itself.

This distinction becomes crucial when the previous judgment is sought to be introduced as evidence in another proceeding.

2. Res Judicata and Relevancy of Judgments: Two Related but Distinct Concepts

One of the most persistent misconceptions in this area is treating res judicata and relevancy of judgments as interchangeable. They are not.Res judicata essentially asks: Can the court entertain a matter that has already been conclusively determined?

The law of evidence, by contrast, asks: When can the existence or substance of a previous judgment be considered relevant in a subsequent proceeding? A previous judgment may therefore be relevant without creating a complete bar to the subsequent proceeding.

For example, a judgment determining a matter of public nature may be relevant in subsequent proceedings even where the parties are different. Similarly, a judgment concerning a person’s legal status may operate against persons who were not parties to the original litigation.

The distinction is reflected in the statutory structure of the BSA.

3. The Statutory Framework Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

Under the repealed Indian Evidence Act, the law concerning previous judgments was primarily contained in Sections 40-44.

The corresponding provisions under the BSA are:

This statutory structure is significant because it demonstrates that the law does not assign a uniform evidentiary effect to all judicial decisions.

Instead, it creates a hierarchy. At one end are judgments whose existence may establish a bar to subsequent litigation. At another are judgments possessing a special status-based effect. Other judgments may merely be relevant in limited circumstances, while some may have no evidentiary relevance at all unless independently connected with a fact in issue.

4. Section 34 BSA: When a Previous Judgment Bars a Subsequent Proceeding

Section 34 BSA corresponds to Section 40 of the Indian Evidence Act. Its purpose is to make the existence of a previous judgment relevant where that judgment is legally capable of preventing a court from entertaining a subsequent suit or trial.

This provision therefore acts as an evidentiary bridge to doctrines such as res judicata. The significance lies in the fact that the previous judgment is relevant because of its legal consequence, not merely because its reasoning may be persuasive.

For example, where a competent court has finally adjudicated a dispute between the same parties and the subsequent proceeding seeks to reopen the same matter, the previous judgment becomes relevant to establish the existence of the earlier adjudication and consequently the bar against re-litigation.

The focus is therefore on the fact and legal effect of the prior adjudication.

5. The Special Status of Judgments In Rem

The most distinctive category is represented by judgments traditionally described as judgments in rem.

Section 35 BSA corresponds to Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act and deals with final judgments, orders or decrees of competent courts exercising specified jurisdictions, including 

probate, matrimonial, admiralty and insolvency jurisdiction, where such adjudication confers, takes away or declares a legal character or status.

The rationale for giving such decisions special evidentiary effect is straightforward. Certain legal statuses cannot sensibly depend upon the identity of the individual litigants in every subsequent proceeding.

If a competent court has conclusively determined a person’s matrimonial status or granted probate in respect of a Will, it would create considerable legal uncertainty if every subsequent proceeding could independently question that status. The law therefore attaches a special consequence to such adjudications.

6. What Makes a Judgment In Rem?

The expression in rem literally conveys the idea of an adjudication concerning a “thing” or status rather than merely an obligation between particular individuals.

Traditionally, a judgment in rem is understood as one which determines the status of a person or thing in such a manner that the determination has effect beyond the immediate parties.

The Madras High Court, in M. Murugan v The Co-operative Sub Registrar/Field Officer-cum-Surcharge Enquiry Officer, explained the traditional distinction between judgments in rem and judgments in personam, observing that the former concern the status of the res and have an effect extending beyond the immediate parties, whereas the latter ordinarily operate between the parties and their privies.

The important point, however, is that the phrase “against the world” should not be understood as meaning that every sentence appearing in the judgment becomes universally binding. The wider effect relates to the legal status or matter which the law treats as conclusively determined.

Thus, it is more accurate to understand a judgment in rem as a judicial determination whose legal operation is not dependent solely upon the personal participation of the parties before the court.

7. Probate as a Classic Example of a Judgment In Rem

Probate proceedings provide one of the clearest illustrations. Where a competent court grants probate, the adjudication concerning the Will is not merely a private determination between the person seeking probate and the persons who happened to oppose it.

The grant of probate has a status-based legal consequence.

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has consistently recognised probate as a proceeding producing a judgment in rem. In Surinder Kumar v. Gyan Chand, the Court recognised the special character of probate proceedings and rejected the argument that a probate determination could be ignored merely because persons affected by it had not been parties to the original proceeding.

This demonstrates the fundamental difference between the two categories. If A sues B for breach of contract, C does not ordinarily become bound by the judgment merely because C knows about it. But where a competent court makes a statutory adjudication determining a legal status in rem, its legal consequences may extend beyond those who physically appeared before the court.

8. Judgment In Personam: The Ordinary Judicial Determination

A judgment in personam operates on an entirely different plane. It determines the rights, duties or   liabilities of particular parties. A contractual dispute is a straightforward example.

Suppose A sues B for breach of contract and obtains damages. The judgment establishes the legal consequences of B’s conduct vis-à-vis A. It does not ordinarily determine the contractual rights of unrelated persons.

Similarly, a decree for recovery of money against A does not automatically establish that every person connected with A owes the same debt.

The ordinary judgment in personam is therefore party-centric.

Its binding effect ordinarily extends to:

• parties;
• persons claiming through them; and
• those in legally recognised privity with them.

This is why the identity of the parties is so important when res judicata is pleaded.

9. In Rem v. In Personam: The Real Distinction

The distinction may be summarised as follows:

The distinction, however, should not be reduced to the simplistic proposition that “all judgments are either against the world or only against parties.”

The legal effect of a judgment depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction, statutory provisions and subject matter of the adjudication.

10. Not Every Property Judgment Is a Judgment In Rem

This distinction has considerable practical importance. A dispute over property does not automatically become a judgment in rem merely because the property itself is involved.

Suppose A and B litigate over ownership of a house. The court decides that A has better title than   B. The mere fact that the litigation concerns property does not mean that the judgment automatically determines ownership against every person in the world. The judgment may remain an adjudication of the rights of A and B.

This is why the nature of the jurisdiction and legal character of the adjudication, rather than simply the subject matter, must be examined.

11. Section 36 BSA: Judgments Concerning Public Matters

Section 36 BSA corresponds to Section 42 of the Indian Evidence Act. It deals with judgments, orders and decrees other than those falling within the special category of Section 35, particularly where they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the inquiry.

This provision illustrates that the evidentiary law occupies a middle ground between complete conclusiveness and complete irrelevance.

A judgment may be relevant because the matter adjudicated upon has a public character, even though the judgment does not operate as a judgment in rem in the strict sense.

Thus, the law recognises that previous judicial determinations can have evidentiary significance beyond the immediate parties without necessarily making every aspect of the judgment universally conclusive.

12. Section 37 BSA: Not Every Judgment Is Relevant

Section 37 BSA corresponds to Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act. Its underlying principle is particularly important in litigation:

A previous judgment does not become relevant merely because it is a judgment. Where a judgment does not fall within the categories specifically recognised by Sections 34-36, it must have an independent basis of relevance.

This prevents parties from introducing unrelated judicial decisions simply because they contain observations favourable to their case.  The rule protects the evidentiary process from becoming a collection of judicial quotations divorced from their legal context.

13. A Judgment Is Not Evidence of Every Fact Recorded in It

This principle deserves particular emphasis.

Suppose a previous judgment records that:

• a witness was unreliable;
• a particular document appeared suspicious;
• a person was allegedly present at an event; or
• a particular transaction appeared doubtful.

It does not follow that these observations automatically become established facts in subsequent proceedings. The later court must determine why the judgment is relevant. 

A judicial decision cannot be treated as a shortcut for proving facts that the present litigant is otherwise required to establish. A judicial decision cannot be treated as a shortcut for proving 

every fact recorded or discussed in it. The evidentiary relevance of a judgment depends upon the statutory basis on which it is introduced and the purpose for which reliance is placed upon it.

This distinction is essential because judicial reasoning often contains:

• findings on issues;
• observations;
• arguments of parties;
• discussion of evidence;
• dicta; and
• the operative conclusion.

They do not all possess identical legal significance.

14. Section 38 BSA: The Safeguard Against Fraud and Collusion

The principle of finality has an important limitation.

Section 38 BSA, corresponding to Section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, permits a party to demonstrate that a previous judgment was affected by fraud or collusion, or that the court which pronounced it lacked the necessary competence.

This provision reflects a fundamental principle of justice: Finality cannot be allowed to legitimise fraud.

If two parties collude to obtain a judgment for the purpose of prejudicing a third person’s rights, the mere existence of that judgment cannot automatically immunise the adjudication from scrutiny.

Similarly, an order passed by a court lacking jurisdiction cannot necessarily acquire validity merely because it has been formally pronounced.

Thus, the law balances two competing considerations: finality of judicial decisions
against integrity of the judicial process.

15. Ameena Amma v. Sundaram Pillai: When an Earlier Order Does Not Amount to Res Judicata

The Supreme Court’s decision in Ameena Amma (Dead) through LRs v. Sundaram Pillai provides a useful illustration of the limits of res judicata in execution proceedings.

The litigation involved a long history of proceedings concerning possession and execution.

An earlier execution petition had been filed against a sub-lessee who was not a party to the original decree. The petition was dismissed because the decree could not be executed against that person in the manner sought.

The question subsequently arose whether that earlier dismissal prevented further proceedings. The Supreme Court declined to treat the earlier order as res judicata. The significance of the decision lies in the Court’s approach: the existence of an earlier order was not enough.

The court examined whether the necessary elements of res judicata were actually present. The earlier proceeding did not represent a final adjudication on the merits between the same parties concerning the relevant issue. Consequently, the dismissal did not acquire the preclusive effect sought to be attributed to it.

16. Why Ameena Amma Matters Beyond Execution Proceedings

The significance of Ameena Amma extends beyond the specific execution dispute.

It demonstrates a broader methodological principle:

The court must examine the substance and legal character of the previous adjudication rather than mechanically applying the label “res judicata.”

The following questions become essential:

• Were the parties the same?
• Were they litigating under the same title?
• Was the issue directly and substantially in issue?
• Was the earlier court competent?
• Was there a final adjudication?
• Was the matter decided on merits?
• Did the earlier order actually determine the issue now being raised?

A negative answer to a necessary requirement may defeat the plea of res judicata.

This makes Ameena Amma particularly valuable in litigation where a party attempts to rely upon an earlier procedural dismissal as though it were a final adjudication.

17. Res Judicata and Execution Proceedings

It would nevertheless be incorrect to conclude that res judicata has no application to execution proceedings.

The Supreme Court has recognised that the general principles of res judicata may apply at different stages of litigation, including execution proceedings.

In Satyadhyan Ghosal, the Court recognised the broader principle that once an issue has been finally determined, the same parties should not ordinarily be permitted to reopen it at a later stage.

The underlying rationale is practical. A decree-holder and judgment-debtor cannot endlessly reopen questions that have already been finally resolved merely by shifting from the trial stage to the appellate stage or subsequently to execution.

At the same time, Ameena Amma demonstrates that not every execution order will attract res judicata. The doctrine remains dependent upon its essential requirements.

18. Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar: Finality Despite Procedural Dismissal

Another important authority is Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar. The Supreme Court explained the conditions necessary for res judicata and considered the effect of appellate proceedings that came to an end on preliminary grounds.

The Court’s reasoning demonstrates that the legal effect of a judgment cannot always be determined merely by asking whether the appellate court conducted a fresh examination of every factual issue.

Where a trial court has finally decided the substantive controversy and the appellate proceeding ends in a manner that leaves that determination intact, the adjudication may acquire finality for purposes of res judicata.

The decision therefore prevents an artificial distinction between: “a judgment affirmed after detailed appellate consideration” and  “a judgment whose merits determination survives because the appeal was dismissed on a legally operative preliminary ground.”

The decisive question is the legal effect of the adjudication, not merely the procedural form in which finality was achieved.

19. The Relationship Between Res Judicata and Precedent

Another distinction that deserves attention is between res judicata and precedent. A judgment may influence a subsequent case for entirely different reasons. Res judicata is concerned primarily with the finality of an adjudication between relevant parties and concerning a particular issue.

Precedent is concerned with the legal principle laid down by a court, particularly a superior court.

For example, when the Supreme Court interprets a provision of law, that interpretation may bind subordinate courts under Article 141 of the Constitution, even where the parties in the subsequent case have no connection whatsoever with the earlier litigation.

That is not res judicata. It is the doctrine of precedent.

The distinction becomes important because a previous judgment may be cited in a later case either:

1. because it is legally binding upon the parties;
2. because it has special evidentiary effect;
3. because it contains an authoritative legal principle; or
4. merely because it is persuasive.

Each situation has a different legal foundation.

20. The Evidentiary Value of a Judgment Depends Upon the Purpose for Which It Is Introduced

The same judgment can potentially assume different significance depending upon the purpose for which it is relied upon.

Consider a previous judgment in A v. B. In a subsequent case, it might be introduced:

First, to establish the existence of the earlier litigation. The existence of a previous judgment may itself constitute a relevant fact where the fact of the judgment, rather than the truth of every finding contained in it, has legal significance. This is expressly contemplated by Section 37 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (“BSA”), under which judgments falling outside Sections 34, 35 and 36 are generally irrelevant unless their existence is itself a fact in issue or is relevant under another provision of the Adhiniyam.

Second, to invoke the doctrine of res judicata. In such a situation, the question is not simply whether an earlier judgment exists, but whether the earlier adjudication satisfies the requirements necessary to prevent a subsequent court from reconsidering the same matter. The governing substantive doctrine is contained in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), while Section 34 BSA recognises the existence of a judgment which, by law, prevents a court from taking cognizance of a subsequent suit or holding a subsequent trial as a relevant fact.

Third, to establish a legal status or character. This becomes particularly important in relation to judgments in rem. Section 35 BSA deals with final judgments, orders or decrees of competent courts or tribunals exercising probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction which confer, take away or declare a legal character or entitlement in an absolute manner. Such judgments are treated as conclusive proof of the legal consequences specified in the provision.

Fourth, as precedent. A judgment may also be relied upon for the legal principle laid down by the court. This is conceptually distinct from its evidentiary relevance under Sections 34–38 BSA. The precedential force of a judicial decision depends upon the constitutional and institutional hierarchy of courts and the doctrine of stare decisis, rather than merely upon the fact that the judgment is relevant evidence.

Fifth, as persuasive authority. Decisions of courts that do not possess binding precedential authority in the proceeding may nevertheless assist the court in determining a question of law. Their persuasive value, however, must not be confused with the statutory conclusiveness attached to certain judgments under Section 35 BSA.

The advocate must therefore identify the precise legal purpose for which the previous judgment is being tendered. A judgment cannot be described as simply “binding” or “relevant” without first determining the legal basis upon which such reliance is sought.

21. The Central Difference: Finality Versus Universality

The distinction between res judicata and a judgment in rem can usefully be understood through the concepts of finality and legal effect.

Res judicata is principally concerned with finality. Once a matter directly and substantially in issue has been heard and finally decided by a competent court between the requisite parties, Section 11 CPC prevents the matter from being reopened in subsequent litigation satisfying the statutory requirements. The Supreme Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal v Deorajin Debi explained that the doctrine is founded upon the need to give finality to judicial decisions: once a matter has been adjudicated between the parties, it should not ordinarily be adjudicated again in future proceedings between them.

A judgment in rem, by contrast, concerns a determination whose legal effect is not confined merely to the immediate dispute between identified parties. Under Section 35 BSA, certain judgments concerning legal character or entitlement are treated as conclusive because the law attaches a status-based effect to the adjudication.

The distinction may therefore be expressed in simplified terms:

Res judicata → finality of adjudication between the persons legally bound by the earlier proceeding.
Judgment in rem → determination of legal status or character to which the law attaches an effect extending beyond the immediate dispute.

Thus, a judgment may be final without being universal. An ordinary decree between A and B may finally determine their respective rights while not automatically binding C, a stranger to the proceedings. Conversely, where a judgment falls within the statutory conception of a judgment in rem, its effect is not dependent merely upon whether every person subsequently affected was personally a party to the original proceeding.

This distinction is particularly important because the expressions in rem and res judicata are sometimes used interchangeably in loose legal discussion, although they address different questions. The former concerns the nature and legal effect of the adjudication, whereas the latter concerns the preclusive effect of a previous adjudication in subsequent proceedings.

22. The Tension Between Finality and Fairness

The doctrine of res judicata inevitably creates a tension. On the one hand, finality is essential. On the other, courts must avoid allowing a technically final judgment to produce injustice where fundamental requirements were absent.

The law addresses this tension through carefully defined exceptions and safeguards. The requirement of competent jurisdiction prevents decisions by courts lacking authority from receiving undeserved preclusive effect. The requirement of final adjudication prevents every interlocutory or procedural order from becoming res judicata.

The requirement concerning same parties or persons claiming through them prevents an ordinary private judgment from automatically binding strangers. And the statutory recognition of fraud and collusion ensures that finality does not become a shield for abuse of process.

The doctrine is therefore not an inflexible rule of procedural convenience. It is a carefully calibrated principle intended to protect both certainty and fairness.

23. Contemporary Significance Under the BSA

The transition from the Indian Evidence Act to the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam does not eliminate the extensive jurisprudence developed around previous judgments.

The statutory numbering has changed, but the underlying conceptual questions remain:

• When does an earlier judgment create a legal bar?
• When is a judgment conclusive?
• When does a judgment affect persons who were not parties?
• What is the evidentiary status of judgments concerning public matters?
• When is a previous judgment merely persuasive?
• Can fraud or want of jurisdiction undermine reliance upon a previous judgment?

These questions remain central to modern litigation.

The BSA therefore should not be viewed merely as a renumbering exercise. For practitioners, the important task is to understand the substantive legal principle behind each provision and then apply the corresponding BSA provision to contemporary proceedings.

24. A Practical Approach for Lawyers

When a previous judgment is sought to be relied upon in a proceeding, the advocate should avoid simply annexing the judgment and asserting that it is “binding.”

A stronger legal analysis should proceed through the following sequence:

First Identify the judgment, What court delivered it? Under what jurisdiction?

Second Identify the nature of adjudication, Is it in rem or in personam?

Third Identify the parties, Are the present parties identical, in privity, or strangers?

Fourth  Identify the precise issue, What exactly was decided?

Fifth Identify the statutory provision, Does the judgment fall within Sections 34, 35, 36 or 37 BSA?

Sixth Examine finality, Was the issue finally adjudicated?

Seventh Check jurisdiction, Was the earlier court competent?

Eighth Examine possible vitiating circumstances, Is there an allegation of fraud, collusion or want of jurisdiction attracting Section 38? This approach prevents the common mistake of treating a judicial decision as a single indivisible piece of evidence.

Conclusion

The law concerning previous judgments sits at the intersection of evidence, procedure and judicial finality.

Res judicata reflects the principle that litigation must eventually come to an end. Yet the evidentiary consequences of a previous judgment depend upon more than the fact that a court has spoken. The law distinguishes between judgments that merely settle personal rights between litigants and those that determine legal status with consequences extending beyond the immediate parties.

The distinction between judgments in personam and judgments in rem is therefore fundamental.

An ordinary judgment in personam generally operates between the parties and those claiming through them. A judgment in rem, particularly one falling within the categories recognised by Section 35 BSA, may have a broader and conclusive effect because it determines a legal status or character in which the law recognises an interest extending beyond the individual litigants.

At the same time, the doctrine of res judicata cannot be invoked mechanically. Ameena Amma v. Sundaram Pillai demonstrates that a previous procedural order does not necessarily amount to a final adjudication capable of barring subsequent proceedings. Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi underscores the foundational importance of finality, while Sheodan Singh v. Daryao 

Kunwar illustrates that finality depends upon the substantive legal effect of the earlier adjudication rather than merely the procedural form in which proceedings terminate.

The statutory scheme under Sections 34–38 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 consequently reflects a carefully graduated approach. Some judgments may operate to bar subsequent proceedings; some possess conclusive status-based effect; others may be relevant because they concern public matters; while judgments falling outside these categories are not rendered relevant merely by virtue of being judicial decisions. The possibility of demonstrating fraud, collusion or incompetency further ensures that finality does not become an instrument of injustice.

Ultimately, the question is not simply whether there was an earlier judgment. The more important questions are:

• What did the earlier court decide?
• Between whom did it decide it?
• Under what jurisdiction?
• Was the determination final?
• And what legal consequence does the law attach to that determination?

The answers to these questions determine whether the previous judgment is merely a piece of litigation history, a binding adjudication between the parties, a judgment in rem operating with wider effect, or a legally relevant piece of evidence in the subsequent proceeding.

In that sense, the law of previous judgments is ultimately a law of boundaries boundaries between finality and re-litigation, between parties and the world, between evidence and proof, and between judicial authority and procedural fairness. It is those boundaries that allow courts to respect the finality of what has already been decided without converting every previous judicial observation into an immutable truth.