This article is written by Krishna Parmar, B. Com. LL.B (Hons.), Marwadi University, Rajkot, during her internship with Le Droit India.
ABSTRACT:
This article critically analyses the enforcement of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (LODR), which seek to harmonise and strengthen corporate governance and disclosure requirements for listed entities in India. Examining the transition from isolated listing agreements to a holistic regulatory framework, the article discusses the aims of LODR, facilitating transparency, safeguarding investors, and upholding market integrity. It enunciates major compliance mandates like disclosure of material events, financial performance, related party deals, and board structure. Through landmark cases such as Piramal Pharma, Infosys, and Yes Bank, the article examines judicial interpretation and regulatory action in response to non-disclosure. It also delves into recent changes that shorten timelines, broaden the disclosure mandates, and add objective tests of materiality. The article concludes that though SEBI has strongly tightened LODR enforcement through reforms, surveillance, and penalties, challenges persist owing to high regulatory volume and limited resources. It calls for companies to look beyond sheer formal compliance and embrace a culture of true transparency and accountability as Indian capital markets become increasingly complicated.
KEY WORDS:
- SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015
- Listing agreements
- Corporate Governance
- Disclosure Requirement
- Regulatory Amendments
INTRODUCTION:
The LODR Regulations are the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations of 2015, hereafter referred to as the LODR Regulations, which stipulate policies that must be complied with by companies that wish to have their shares traded on stock exchanges. These regulations replaced the former Listing Agreement, which was an agreement between companies and stock exchanges. The SEBI LODR Regulations 2015 seek to enhance sustained corporate governance by ensuring that listed entities retain good corporate governance practices and provide relevant information regularly to shareholders and other stakeholders. This enhances informed decision-making by investors while fostering transparency in the market. The regulations are comprehensive, covering such diverse issues as composition of the board, financial statements, material events reporting, intercompany dealings and shareholders’ participation rights. These are mandatory for all companies listed in any of the recognised stock exchanges in India.
BACKGROUND & EVOLUTION OF SEBI LODR REGULATIONS:
The necessity for a broad and consistent regulatory regime for Indian trading companies has been recognised over a long period of time because earlier enactments used to be fragmented and at times inconsistent. Before the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, listed companies were governed by a multi-faceted web of:
- Listing agreements with stock exchanges
- Provisions under the Companies Act, 1956/2013
- Sectoral guidelines and circulars issued by SEBI and other regulators.
These listing arrangements, entered separately by companies and stock exchanges, were inconsistent, legally unsound, and non-enforceable. In addition, disclosures were often late, inconsistent, or incomplete, undermining investor protection and market transparency. SEBI realised that India needed a single, coherent, and enforced law that would harmonise the compliance framework for all listed companies.
Before 2015, listed companies had to comply with something called the Listing Agreement. It was an agreement that they entered with the stock exchanges where their shares were being traded. The catch was that the agreement was not quite as legally enforceable as rules made under the SEBI Act.
The Listing Agreement was modified, with significant changes occurring in 2000 and 2006, particularly regarding corporate governance. Clause 49 of the agreement regarding corporate governance was highly significant and was altered multiple times.
India was given a new Companies Act in 2013, which had several provisions for better corporate governance. SEBI needed to tighten its rules to be consistent with the new legislation and to make its rules legally stronger.
India passed a new Companies Act in 2013, which included numerous requirements for improved corporate governance. SEBI needs to reform its rules to align with the new law and make them legally stronger.
UNDERSTANDING THE LODR FRAMEWORK:
The LODR are a 2015 set of norms brought by SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India, a government-established statutory board aimed at regulating the Indian securities market for ensuring transparency and safeguarding investors’ interests) to enhance corporate governance practices and raise stock market transparency.
SEBI has periodically amended the LODR to align with prevailing market conditions and regulatory changes. The requirements are framed and amended to provide for the timely availability of information regarding publicly traded companies to the investors, to hold companies responsible for their conduct and financial reporting, and to safeguard investor interests using disclosure standards and governance practices and hence promote investor confidence.
OBJECTIVES OF LODR:
- Ensure transparency and accountability in financial markets.
- Protect investors and maintain market integrity.
- Prevent fraud, mismanagement, and market manipulation to create a fair market.
- Foster a healthy investment environment that supports investor confidence. Support overall economic development and growth through a reliable and stable financial system.
OBLIGATIONS AND COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS UNDER LODR:
| Regulation | Obligation / Requirement | Details |
| Reg. 30 | Disclosure of Material Events | Disclosure of events like M&A, Board decisions, resignations, litigations, etc. |
| Reg. 33 | Financial Results | Submission of quarterly and annual results, with segment reporting |
| Reg. 31 | Shareholding Pattern | Detailed quarterly shareholding disclosure (promoter/public/FIIs) |
| Reg. 23 | Related Party Transactions (RPTs) | Approval & disclosure of RPTs; shareholder approval for material RPTs |
| Reg. 7(3) | Compliance Certificate | Certificate from the compliance officer and RTA |
| Reg. 24A | Secretarial Compliance Report | Annual report by a practising company secretary on SEBI law compliance |
| Reg. 46 | Website Disclosure | Hosting of key policies, codes, financials, and contact info on the website |
| Reg. 27(2) | Corporate Governance Report | Quarterly governance compliance report in SEBI format |
| Reg. 34 | Annual Report & BRSR | Annual report submission including governance, audit reports, BRSR for the top 1000 |
| Reg. 13 | Investor Grievance Redressal | Quarterly statement of complaints received, resolved, pending |
LANDMARK CASES ON SEBI LODR REGULATIONS:
- Matter of Piramal Pharma Limited:
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has acquitted Piramal Pharma Limited (PPL) of alleged breach of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (LODR Regulations). The investigation focused on PPL’s failure to report two regulatory events: a ₹8.32 crore penalty from the National Green Tribunal for environmental non-compliance and a 44-day closure of the Digwal manufacturing site ordered by the Telangana Pollution Control Board. Although these occurrences occurred before to PPL’s demerger from Piramal Enterprises Limited (PEL) in 2020, SEBI contended that PPL, as the legal successor to PEL’s pharma business, was required to disclose such material events under the LODR framework.
However, SEBI eventually concluded that the instances under consideration were not significantly relevant. It evaluated the financial and operational consequences of the events, noting that the penalty was very small and that the plant shutdown had little impact due to significant inventory reserves. Furthermore, the delayed disclosure had no obvious impact on investor sentiment or market behaviour. As a result, SEBI determined that PPL did not breach Regulations 30(3) and 30(4) of the LODR Regulations and closed the investigation without imposing penalties. This case emphasises that, while successor firms may have disclosure duties for pre-demerger events, only events having a significant investor or market impact require mandatory disclosure under LODR.
- Infosys v. SEBI (2020):
The focus was on whistleblower disclosure obligations. When Infosys received whistleblower reports about alleged unethical conduct, it raised concerns about when and how much to reveal.
The SAT stated: “While companies require time to consider whistleblower charges, they cannot postpone disclosure if the allegations are potentially material. Even if the claims are later proven to be false, investors have the right to be aware of them if they have the potential to significantly influence investment decisions.
- Yes Bank v. SEBI (2021) case:
This case addressed the veracity of financial disclosures. Yes Bank had underestimated its non-performing assets (NPAs) in its financial statements, which SEBI said was a violation of the LODR Regulations.
In its decision, the SAT stated: “The accuracy of financial statements is critical to market integrity. Banking corporations bear an even greater duty due to their role in the financial system. Hiding problematic loans through innovative accounting goes against both the word and spirit of the disclosure rules.
RECENT AMENDMENTS:
The changes materially alter key provisions of the LODR Regulations, including the:
- disclosure framework, by inter alia introducing objective criteria for determining material events/ information, reducing the timeline for making disclosures and mandating additional disclosures (including about agreements binding listed entities and addressing market rumours)
- disclosure and approval requirements for special rights granted to shareholders
- approval requirements for business transfer agreements undertaken outside the scheme of arrangement route, and (iv) validity of permanent board seats and timelines for filling vacancies of directors and KMPs.
- Disclosure Framework – (Regulation 30 read with Schedule III):
- Objective criteria for determining materiality of disclosable events (Regulation 30(4) read with Paragraph B of Part A of Schedule III)
- Mandatory disclosures of continuing events/ information (Regulation 30(4))
- Materiality policy (Regulation 30(4)):
- Revised disclosure timelines for material events/ information (Regulation 30(6))
- Disclosure of agreements binding listed entities (Regulation 30A read with Paragraph 5A of Part A of Schedule III)
- Verification of rumours – (Regulation 30(11))
- Other additional disclosures – (Paragraphs A and B of Part A of Schedule III)
- Shareholders’ approval of special rights (Regulation 31B)
- Public shareholder approval for business transfer agreements (Regulation 37A)
EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEMENT OF LODR REGULATIONS:
SEBI’s enforcement of the LODR Regulations has evolved. Initially, the goal was to educate companies about the new regulations and encourage voluntary compliance. In recent years, SEBI has strengthened its enforcement. It has levied severe penalties on corporations and their directors for violations of disclosure and corporate governance standards.
The regulator has focused specifically on financial disclosure issues. Misstatements of financial performance or concealment of significant information regarding a company’s financial status have resulted in harsh penalties. SEBI has also imposed severe board composition standards. Companies that do not have the required number of independent directors or women directors face penalties and public reprimand. The stock exchanges, which serve as the first line of enforcement, have strengthened their surveillance systems. They monitor compliance through frequent reports given by listed businesses and report any suspected infractions to SEBI.
Improvements in compliance statistics demonstrate the effectiveness of enforcement. For example, most publicly listed companies today have the required number of independent and female directors, as opposed to severe noncompliance when these criteria were originally established.
However, enforcement issues continue. With thousands of listed businesses to monitor, SEBI and stock exchanges have limited resources for rigorous oversight. They frequently use complaints or media reports to discover infractions. Even while the penalty amounts have grown in recent years, they may still be insufficient to discourage huge companies.
CONCLUSION:
The LODR Regulations are an important instrument in SEBI’s regulatory arsenal for promoting market discipline, ensuring fair disclosure, and protecting investor interests. These regulations are enforced rather strictly, with defined fines, continuous monitoring, and increased use of technology.
However, as with any regulatory structure, enforcement faces obstacles such as volume, interpretation, and judicial delays. SEBI’s proactive changes, improved stakeholder responsibility, and focus on ESG and investor protection demonstrate its commitment to effective enforcement.
As India’s capital markets expand and become more complicated, enforcement will become increasingly stringent. To be consistent with the spirit of LODR laws, listed organisations must evolve beyond tick-box compliance and embrace a culture of transparency and responsibility.
