THE INTERSECTION OF COMPETITION LAW AND IPR IN INDIA: LICENSING AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE

This Article is written by VARSHINI VS, THE TAMILNADU Dr. AMBEDKAR LAW UNIVERSITY, BBA LLB (hons.), VTH YEAR during her internship at LeDroit India.

Scope of Article:

• Introduction
• Understanding the interface between Competition law and IPR
• Statutory Framework in India
• Licensing Practices and Competition Concerns
• Abuse of Dominant Position in IP-Heavy Markets
• Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) and FRAND Obligations
• Key Indian Case Law at the Intersection of Competition Law and IPR
  Comparative Perspectives
• Innovation, Competition, and Public Interest
• Policy Gaps and Challenges
• Recommendations and way Forward
• Conclusion

Abstract:

In India, there is a fundamental contradiction between competition law and intellectual property rights (IPR): competition law limits the use of market power to protect consumer welfare and market justice, while IP law offers exclusive rights to encourage innovation. In technology-driven industries, where licensing, cross-licensing, and standardisation procedures influence market results, this interaction becomes especially important. The Competition Act of 2002’s interface between these two regimes is critically examined in this essay, with a focus on licensing practices, licence refusals, exorbitant royalty requests, discriminatory conditions, and other actions that might be considered abuse of dominance under Section 4.

It examines the limited safe harbour for reasonable protection of intellectual property rights under Section 3(5) and assesses the extent to which such exceptions shield right-holders from competition assessment. The article discusses the development of Indian jurisprudence on anti-competitive IP exploitation through significant rulings of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) concerning Standard Essential Patents (SEPs), FRAND duties, digital platforms, and trademark licensing. India’s regulatory strategy is further contextualised by comparing lessons from the US and the EU.

In order to ensure that IPR is used in a way that is consistent with competitive market structures and long-term consumer welfare, the study concludes that while both regimes pursue complementary goals, innovation and competition. India must improve its enforcement standards, define jurisdictional overlaps, and issue thorough licensing guidelines.

Key Words: Competition Law, Licensing, Abuse of Dominance, Standard Essential Patents, Digital Markets.

1. Introduction:

There has long been a perceived conflict between market openness and exclusivity in the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPR) and competition law. In order to promote innovation, investment, and information sharing, intellectual property rules offer creators limited monopolies. Contrarily, competition law aims to keep markets open, equitable, and effective while preventing the excessive concentration of economic power.

With the emergence of digital ecosystems, technology-led markets, and standard-driven sectors like consumer electronics, software, and telecommunications, this relationship has become more crucial in India. Through statutory exclusions, the Competition Act of 2002 acknowledges the legitimacy of intellectual property rights while offering a contemporary framework for controlling anti-competitive activity. The legal foundation for evaluating licensing limitations, refusals to deal, discriminatory terms, and exploitative pricing by dominant IP holders is established in Sections 3(5) and 4.

However, when IPR is used in a way that undermines consumer welfare or distorts competition, it is subject to review. Growing concerns about restrictive licensing methods, high royalties, unfair standard-essential patent (SEP) terms, tying arrangements, and the use of IP-based dominance in digital marketplaces are shown by Indian enforcement patterns, particularly through the Competition Commission of India (CCI).

Significant jurisprudence on the acceptable bounds of IP exploitation has been produced by cases like Ericsson, Shamsher Kataria, Google Android, and trademark-related licensing issues. Simultaneously, firms and innovators have experienced confusion due to jurisdictional overlaps between CCI and IP authorities, conflicting judicial interpretations, and the lack of comprehensive licensing standards. This article looks at these issues, places them in the context of international regulatory developments, and evaluates how India might effectively balance safeguarding innovation incentives with reducing anti-competitive behaviour in IP-intensive markets.

2. Understanding the Interface Between Competition Law and IPR:

A basic conceptual contradiction shapes the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPR) and competition law: IPR confers exclusivity, whereas competition law limits the misuse of monopoly. However, these regimes are increasingly functioning as complementing rather than antagonistic systems in contemporary markets. Time-bound monopolies are granted by intellectual property laws to encourage innovation, technical development, and public information sharing. Whether they are patents, copyrights, trademarks, or designs, these exclusive rights give right holders the ability to manage how their inventions are used, reproduced, and exploited for profit. The idea that businesses might not be motivated to spend in R&D in the absence of such exclusivity is supported by economic theory.

However, anti-competitive results cannot be justified by exclusivity alone. By prohibiting actions that artificially limit output, increase prices, or restrict market access, competition law seeks to guarantee that markets operate effectively. India uses an effects-based methodology under the Competition Act, 2002 to assess whether agreements or unilateral actions have “appreciable adverse effects on competition” (AAEC). This concept acknowledges that while intellectual property (IP) grants legal monopolies, these monopolies do not always result in economic domination. It is necessary to evaluate dominance in light of customer reliance, entry obstacles, innovation dynamics, and substitutability.

When the exercise of intellectual property rights, particularly through licensing, refusal to license, royalty structures, or protectionist contractual terms, affects market competition, the interface becomes crucial. As technology marketplaces grow rapidly, the balance between innovation incentives and competition safeguards becomes critical for guaranteeing long-term customer welfare, interoperability, and market access. This sophisticated perspective is becoming more and more reflected in Indian jurisprudence, which positions IPR and competition law as interrelated systems that must work together to promote innovation driven economic progress.

3. Statutory Framework in India:

Since exclusivity cannot be abused to distort markets, the Indian legal system intentionally accepts the coexistence of intellectual property rules and competition regulation. The primary law governing combinations, abuse of power, and anti-competitive agreements is the Competition Act, 2002. The Act guarantees that statutory rights do not become vehicles for unfair market practices, even though it authorises IPR-driven restrictions when they are reasonably necessary to defend those rights. Sections 3(5) and 4, as well as the Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) authority under Section 19 to investigate anti-competitive behaviour affecting intellectual property, best capture this balancing. Thus, by establishing both safe harbours and regulatory inspections, India’s statutory system combines innovative incentives with consumer welfare.

3.1 Section 3(5): The IPR Exception to Anti-Competitive Agreements:

Agreements that have a “appreciable adverse effect on competition” (AAEC) are prohibited by Section 3 of the Competition Act. Nonetheless, the legitimate exercise of rights granted by the Patents Act, Copyright Act, Trade Marks Act, Designs Act, and Geographical Indications Act is granted a qualified exemption under Section 3(5). This section recognises that in order to preserve the value and integrity of intellectual property, certain restrictive conditions, such as exclusive licensing, territorial limitations, or quality-control obligations which may be required.

However, this is not a complete exception. Only when limitations are “reasonably necessary” to protect the intellectual property right does the immunity apply. Practices that fall beyond the safe harbour and are subject to investigation under Section 3(1) include resale price maintenance, exorbitant royalty demands, linking unrelated items, and imposing unreasonable geographical limits. IPR cannot be used as a general excuse for anti-competitive activity, according to Indian jurisprudence. The influence on consumer welfare, proportionality of limits, and market structure are some of the variables that determine “reasonableness.”

3.2 Section 4: Abuse of Dominant Position in IP Contexts:

Regardless matter whether dominance results from IPR or other market circumstances, Section 4 deals with the abuse of dominant position. Dominance does not always result from possessing a patent, trademark, or copyright; rather, it might develop when the protected technology or brand becomes essential for engaging in the market. Market share, entry hurdles, reliance on intellectual property, opposing buyer power, and the availability of alternatives are some of the criteria used by the CCI to evaluate dominance.

There are two main types of abusive behaviour under Section 4: exclusionary and exploitative. Excessive fees, unreasonable licensing terms, discriminatory treatment of licensees, or demands that are out of proportion to the technology’s worth are examples of exploitative exploitation in IP-rich markets. Refusing to grant licenses, linking and bundling proprietary technologies with unrelated items, exclusive dealing agreements, or royalty structures that shut out rival technologies are all common examples of exclusionary abuses. Instead of only looking at whether exclusivity exists, the CCI’s methodology now focusses on whether IP-based behaviour restricts market access or distorts competitive conditions.

3.3 Jurisdictional Overlap: CCI v. IP Authorities:

Multiple authorities with overlapping mandates make up India’s regulatory environment. Specialised IP statutes govern patent validity, registration, and mandatory licensing, which are managed by the IP Appellate Board’s successor procedures and the Patent Office. However, the CCI asserts authority under the Competition Act where licensing practices, royalty conditions, or refusal to license have an impact on competition.

Debates have been triggered by this overlap, especially when it comes to Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). In the Ericsson case, the Delhi High Court considered the limits between competition scrutiny and patent enforcement operations. Courts upheld the CCI’s authority to look into anti-competitive licensing activities even as they recognised that patent rights confer exclusivity. The prevailing view is that competition law governs how the right is exercised, whereas intellectual property statutes confer the right. As a result, both regimes function simultaneously and neither overrides the other’s authority. Avoiding conflicting conclusions and maintaining enforcement’s coherence, effectiveness, and openness to innovation are the challenges.

4. Licensing Practices and Competition Concerns:

One of the most significant methods for commercialising, distributing, and monetising intellectual property rights (IPR) is licensing. Although licensing agreements can increase market access, foster technological transfer, and foster innovation, they may also present chances for anti-competitive activity. Through the dual lenses of Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) assesses licensing practices in India to determine if limits imposed by right-holders are reasonable, essential, and consistent with a healthy market.

When licensing terms disrupt market circumstances, foreclose competitors, or place unreasonable constraints on licensees instead of safeguarding the lawful scope of the intellectual property right, competition problems usually surface. In order to protect consumer welfare and foster innovation-driven competition, it is now even more crucial to examine licensing policies due to the quick expansion of digital platforms, software markets, and standard-driven technologies.

4.1 Types of Licensing Arrangements:

Depending on the type of intellectual property, the parties’ business goals, and industry norms, licensing agreements can take many different forms. Exclusive licenses, which are sometimes justified by the need to guarantee quality control or market investment, provide the licensee exclusive rights in a specific area or sector of use. Multiple users are permitted by non-exclusive licenses, which promote the wider distribution of technology or information.

Businesses can combine complementary technology and prevent infringement litigation by using cross-licensing, which is popular in industries with overlapping patents. In order to save transaction costs and improve interoperability, patent pooling enables several IP holders to combine their patents, frequently for standardised technology. Software licenses, open-source frameworks, and subscription-based licensing arrangements are the most common in digital markets. Each of these agreements has good pro-competitive reasons, but if they are set up in a way that limits access, creates artificial hurdles, or locks people in, they may also pose hazards.

4.2 Anti Competitive Licensing Restrictions:
Under the Competition Act, some license terms may be problematic, especially if they are imposed by a dominant right-holder or have exclusionary consequences. Common concerns include:

• Territorial restrictions: Excessive territorial segmentation may prohibit licensees from accessing larger markets or participating in parallel imports, even while they are allowed to maintain quality or control distribution.
• Limitations on output: Without a valid IP-based explanation, restrictions on the amount a licensee can create may artificially lower supply and raise prices.
• Clauses pertaining to Most Favoured Nations (MFN): MFNs might inhibit competitive pricing or prohibit licensors from offering differentiated royalties, despite their stated goal of ensuring parity.
• No-challenge clauses: Clauses that prohibit licensees from challenging the validity of intellectual property can be problematic, particularly if they shield dubious or weak patents from examination.
• Grant-back obligations: If used excessively or solely, requiring licensees to return improvements or derivative ideas to the licensor may inhibit subsequent innovation.
• Tying and bundling: It may be anti-competitive to require licensees to buy unrelated goods or services in order to have access to intellectual property, especially if the tying product is essential.

In each of these situations, CCI assesses whether the restriction is appropriate for safeguarding intellectual property or if it goes beyond what is deemed reasonably reasonable and thus constitutes an anti-competitive restraint.

4.3 Pro-Competitive benefits of Licensing:

In contemporary economies, licensing frequently serves a crucial pro-competitive function notwithstanding possible hazards. Effective license agreements can help innovation spread, giving efficient businesses access to cutting-edge technology and promoting competitive marketplaces. Additionally, licensing promotes teamwork, cuts down on redundant research, and enables businesses to integrate complementary technology for better product offers.

Licensing can reduce entry barriers in industries like software, telecommunications, and pharmaceuticals by enabling startups or smaller businesses to access existing IP without requiring significant internal R&D. Additionally, patent pools and cross-licensing agreements can minimise litigation costs and encourage standardisation, which benefits consumers by lowering costs and facilitating interoperability. Therefore, competition law aims to ensure that the way intellectual property is licensed fosters long-term innovation, market dynamism, and consumer welfare rather than penalising licensing in and of itself.

5. Abuse of Dominant Position in IP-Heavy Markets:

In intellectual property-driven markets, dominance frequently results from the indispensability of a patented technology, a well-known trademark, or proprietary software rather than just size or resources. The Competition Act of 2002 forbids the abusive use of dominance rather than condemning it per se. The worry in IP-heavy industries including consumer electronics, medicines, digital platforms, and telecommunications is that the exclusivity granted by IPR could result in market strength that could distort competitive circumstances.

Indian competition law assesses whether a dominant IP holder’s actions are exclusionary, exploitative, or both, and whether they hinder innovation, market entry, or consumer welfare. The goal is to prevent these rights from being used as a means of foreclosure or unjust extraction, not to weaken the genuine rights of creators.

5.1 Dominance Through IPR:

An IP right alone does not produce dominance, but dominance may occur when a patented technology or private system becomes a market norm or needed for effective competition. When there are few or no alternatives, patents covering key technology, platform-specific operating systems, or popular medicinal compounds can grant significant market dominance. The CCI evaluates dominance based on elements like:

• control over vital inputs and market share,
• advantage in technology and obstacles to entry,
• reliance of manufacturers or users on the protected intellectual property,
• absence of workable alternatives,
• consequences of networks in digital environments.

The Commission takes into account dynamic competition in innovation-driven industries, acknowledging that IP exclusivity and first-mover advantages may solidify market positions beyond the patent’s natural scope.

5.2 Refusal to License as Abuse:

Since exclusivity is an element of the right-holder’s claim, refusing to license an intellectual property right is not intrinsically illegal. However, the refusal may be abusive if it denies necessary market access and lacks objective explanation. International jurisprudence, particularly in the EU, specifies a few circumstances in which refusal to provide a licence becomes anti-competitive: where the intellectual property is essential, refusal reduces effective competition, and licensing is required for innovation in related sectors. The CCI in India uses a case-by-case methodology. Refusals could be deemed abusive if:

• The IP is essential for involvement,
• Access is denied by the dominant company on arbitrary or discriminatory grounds.
• The rejection seeks to prevent competition or obtain undue leverage.

Only in order to impose exploitative terms on other licensees is licensing rejected.Competition law can step in when rejection amounts to market foreclosure or negatively impacts consumer welfare, even though mandatory licensing under the Patents Act is a separate procedure.

5.3 Excessive Pricing and Unfair Royalties:

Section 4 recognises excessive pricing as a type of exploitative mistreatment. This frequently happens in IP contexts through:

• requesting royalties that have nothing to do with the IP’s worth “
• imposing royalties on whole devices rather than just the patented part (a practice known as “royalty base inflation”),
• imposing royalties after the patent has expired,
• implementing unfair or opaque royalty structures.

In India’s SEP conflicts, where the CCI examined whether licensing terms for telecommunications patents were fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory, excessive royalty requests have played a major role. The main focus is on whether royalty demands serve as obstacles to market entrance, raising consumer prices and deterring new rivals, or if they represent true innovation value.

5.4 Discriminatory Licensing:

When a dominating IP holder gives similarly situated licensees differing terms without providing objective justification, this is discrimination. This could entail:

• charging equivalent producers radically different royalties,
• selective provision of access to technology,
• placing burdensome requirements on some licensees while exempting others,
• strategically use grant-back requirements, NDAs, or tie-ins.

By favouring some players, increasing the costs of competitors, or solidifying alliances in vertically integrated markets, discriminatory licensing can stifle competition. According to the CCI’s research, discrimination is abusive not just when licensees pay different prices but also when it has a noticeable negative impact on competition.

6. Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) and FRAND Obligations:

Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) are now at the forefront of international competition and intellectual property discussions due to the quick growth of the telecommunications, smartphone, Internet of Things, and digital electronics industries. One of the most important areas where IPR and competition law cross is in SEP licensing issues, especially where patent exclusivity satisfies requirements and network effects. The fundamental knowledge of FRAND requirements, jurisdictional overlaps, and the boundaries of SEP enforcement has been shaped in India by the dispute involving Ericsson and several phone makers.

6.1 Understanding Standard Essential Patents:

When using a patented technique is necessary to comply with an industry standard, the patent becomes “standard-essential.” Standard-Setting Organisations (SSOs) like 3GPP, IEEE, and ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute) usually create these standards. Their goal is to guarantee technological consistency, compatibility, and interoperability across markets, networks, and devices.

SEPs provide particular issues for competition law because to:

• Lock-in effects: Implementers are unable to stop employing proprietary technology once a standard is accepted without going out of business.
• Increased negotiating power: Standard adoption rather than innovation alone gives the patent holder ex post market power.
• Risk of hold-up: Once the industry becomes reliant on the standard, SEP holders may impose burdensome licensing terms or demand exorbitant royalties.
• Risk of hold-out: On the other hand, implementers might undervalue patented technology or postpone license negotiations.

Therefore, maintaining both market competitiveness and incentives for innovation requires balanced regulation.

6.2 FRAND Commitments: Purpose and Global Understanding:

SEP holders must license their patents on Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms, according to the majority of SSOs. After a standard has been generally accepted, FRAND obligations are meant to stop SEP owners from abusing their increased bargaining power.

Fair: Prior to standardisation, a “fair” royalty corresponds to the patented technology’s economic worth. It stops SEP owners from taking advantage of monopoly rents that result solely from the standard.

Reasonable: In order to be reasonable, royalties must take into account:

• the patent’s technological contribution;
• the lowest saleable patent-practicing unit’s (SSPPU) value;
• issues with royalties stacking; and
• the environment of competition.

Not Discriminatory: Comparable treatment must be given to implementers under similar circumstances. Selective imposition of tight licensing requirements or different royalty rates may be considered discriminatory behaviour.

6.3 Indian SEP Disputes and Jurisprudential Evolution:

Following complaints from several smartphone makers, including Micromax, Intex, and iBall, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) launched a series of investigations against Ericsson, which escalated India’s involvement with SEP/FRAND concerns. Important issues with exorbitant pricing, discriminatory licensing, jurisdictional overlap, and proper market definition were brought up by these instances.

• Micromax v. Ericsson: Micromax claimed that rather than focussing on the patent-implementing component, Ericsson demanded outrageous royalties based on the total device worth. The CCI noted that if such a royalty computation is used consistently to both high-end and low-end devices, it may be initially unjust and discriminatory.

• Intex v. Ericsson, Similar accusations were made by Intex, which reaffirmed the claim that using device-level royalty bases can stifle competition. The CCI reaffirmed that, on the surface, such actions would be considered abuse of dominance under Section 4.

• Delhi High Court’s Intervention: Ericsson contested CCI’s authority, claiming that the Patents Act alone governs disputes pertaining to patent payments. In 2016 and subsequent appeals, the Delhi High Court ruled that the CCI has the authority to investigate anti-competitive behaviour even in cases involving patented inventions, provided that this authority does not interfere with the patent system’s adjudicatory powers. As a result, a dual-framework strategy was developed: (a) The Patent Act governs patent validity and infringement. (b) Discriminatory licensing, royalty fairness, and anti-competitive behaviour are all subject to examination under the Competition Act. IPR does not automatically grant insulation from competitive inquiry, as this jurisprudence has proven.

6.4 Competition Concerns in SEP Licensing:

• Excessive Royalty and Royalty Stacking: Royalty base calculation, whether royalties should be based on: (a) the whole apparatus, or (b) the SSPPU, or smallest saleable patent practicing unit. The welfare of consumers may be compromised, prices may increase, and smaller producers may be prevented from entering the market by excessive and cumulative royalties from several SEP holders (stacking).

• Discriminatory Licensing Terms: CCI has often raised concerns regarding: (a) varying royalties to licensees in comparable positions, (b) stringent NDAs that hinder openness, (c) non-FRAND obligations for others who use the same standard.
  
• Unfair Conditions in License Agreement: Examples consist of: (a) required cross-licensing conditions that benefit the owner of the SEP; (b) forum selection provisions that significantly harm the licensee; (c) linking SEPs to non-essential patents; (d) postponing talks as a calculated move.

7. Key Indian Case Law at the Intersection of Competition Law and IPR:

At the intersection of intellectual property rights (IPR) and competition law, Indian jurisprudence has developed mostly through case-driven growth. India’s regulatory environment strikes a balance between market fairness and innovation incentives, as demonstrated by a number of significant rulings by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) and interventions by the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court. The following examples show the growing significance of competition principles in IP sectors in a variety of scenarios, including vehicle spare parts, standard essential patents, digital markets, and trademark licensing.

7.1 Shamsher Kataria v. Honda SIEL Cars India Ltd (Automobile Spare Parts Case):

In the Shamsher Kataria case, it was alleged that major automakers denied independent repairers access to technical documents, diagnostic tools, and replacement parts, citing copyright protection as justification. According to the CCI, the corporations exploited their control in their respective aftermarkets by inflating repair costs for customers, enforcing unfair conditions, and erecting artificial hurdles to entry.

The manufacturers’ reliance on IPR was rejected by the Commission, which emphasised that exclusive rights cannot be used as an excuse for exploitative pricing or market foreclosure. The case established a significant precedent that IPR protection must function in accordance with competition obligations, especially in markets marked by consumer lock-in, by acknowledging the aftermarket as a distinct relevant market and treating restrictive copyright-based controls as anti-competitive.

7.2 The Ericsson SEP Investigations:

The main charges in the Ericsson SEP cases were that the business enforced restrictive NDAs and discriminatory licensing terms, and sought excessive royalties for its 2G, 3G, and 4G SEPs. These royalties were frequently computed based on the overall device price rather than the relevant component. The CCI initially believed that Ericsson dominated the SEP market and that its unreasonable and non FRAND compliant licensing methods would violate Section 4. After Ericsson contested the CCI’s jurisdiction, the Delhi High Court ruled that although the Patents Act governs patent validity, competition agencies have the authority to evaluate abusive licensing practices. India’s fundamental approach to FRAND, exorbitant pricing, and the competition analysis relevant to SEP enforcement was shaped by these cases.

7.3 Google Android Case (Mobiles OS Licensing and Play Store Bundling):

In the Google Android case, the CCI investigated whether Google used restrictive licensing arrangements connected to its proprietary Android ecosystem to capitalise on its dominance in the market for licensable mobile operating systems. Google created tying and bundling issues and strengthened Google’s market dominance by requiring device manufacturers to pre-install Google Search, Chrome, and other apps as a condition of licensing the Play Store.

Despite the fact that Google’s technology was protected by copyright, the CCI determined that this behaviour was unfair, exclusive, and in violation of Section 4. In particular, when interoperability and access to vital app ecosystems are at risk, the decision established that IP ownership over software does not justify contractual restrictions that foreclose rivals or distort digital markets.

7.4 United Breweries/Mike Tyson Trademark Licensing Case:

In this case, it was alleged that the “Mike Tyson” trademark’s exclusive geographical license for alcoholic beverages resulted in anti-competitive market segmentation. According to the CCI, exclusive trademark licensing is not anti-competitive on its own unless it causes significant negative impacts on competition, such collusion, price manipulation, or foreclosure.

The Commission concluded that there was no such effect and pointed out that territorial exclusivity can be used for justifiable business objectives including quality assurance and brand distinctiveness. The ruling made it clear that trademark rights may be licensed exclusively without going against Section 3, as long as the arrangement doesn’t limit consumer choice or distort market structure. The case made a distinction between anti-competitive market allocation and lawful IP based exclusivity.

8. Comparative Perspectives:

8.1 European Union Approach:
One of the most organised frameworks in the world for regulating the relationship between IPR and competition law is adopted by the EU. While defining “hardcore restrictions” such territorial market partitioning, price fixing, or limitations on passive sales, the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER) offers safe harbours for licensing agreements that typically do not impair competition.

In significant cases like IMS Health and Microsoft, where refusal to share interoperability information was deemed abusive due to the existence of indispensability, market dominance, and elimination of competition, EU jurisprudence has played a formative role in the global debate on refusal to license. Particularly in Huawei v. ZTE, EU courts have emphasised FRAND responsibilities in SEP contexts, highlighting good-faith bargaining, proportionality, and striking a balance between patent enforcement and consumer welfare. In general, the EU’s strategy acknowledges the legality of IPR exploitation while placing a high priority on market access, interoperability, and innovation protection.

8.2 United States Approach:

Based on the idea that intellectual property rights do not always translate into market dominance, the United States adopts a more pro-IP position. The DOJ-FTC Antitrust Guidelines promote effective technology diffusion by framing licensing as usually pro-competitive.

The refusal-to-deal doctrine is applied narrowly: rulings such as Trinko and Aspen Skiing emphasise that companies are not required by antitrust law to support competitors unless previous voluntary transactions were discontinued for anti-competitive reasons. U.S. agencies have taken different positions in SEP disputes; in the past, they saw injunctions on FRAND encumbered SEPs as perhaps anti-competitive, while later guidelines permitted greater latitude in patent enforcement. In essence, the United States supports limited involvement, viewing unilateral licensing decisions as legal unless they blatantly restrict competition or impose unjustified restrictions.

8.3 Lessons for India:

Both jurisdictions provide insightful information about India’s changing environment. India can adopt formal guidelines from the EU, such as TTBER-style safe harbours and more precise standards for evaluating FRAND compliance, unreasonable royalty demands, and license denial. India may learn from the United States about preserving legal certainty for innovators and avoiding excessive intervention with lawful IP usage. India needs a calibrated approach that acknowledges the pro-competitive potential of licensing while prohibiting actions that impair consumer welfare, increase entry barriers, or distort access. To reconcile India’s dual goals of promoting innovation and protecting competition, the CCI and IP authorities must have clear guidelines, predictable remedies, and constructive coordination.

9. Innovation, Competition, and Public Interest:

The management of IP intensive marketplaces is at the core of the mutually reinforcing link between innovation and competition. The welfare of consumers and market dynamism can be greatly improved by licensing policies that support technology distribution, interoperability, and cooperative development. However, restrictive licensing can impede innovation, especially for MSMEs and start-ups that depend on inexpensive access to foundational technologies.

Examples of this include exclusionary royalty structures, discriminatory access, or refusal to license essential technologies. Therefore, by prohibiting dominant IP holders from obstructing market entrance or distorting innovation routes, competition law serves a corrective function. In digital and networked markets, where data, algorithms, and proprietary standards raise entry barriers, this becomes particularly crucial. In the end, a fair legal system that encourages innovation while maintaining contestable markets is necessary for the public interest and consumer welfare.

10. Policy Gaps and Challenges:

10.1 Absence to Detailed Guidelines on IPR Competition Interface:

Similar to the EU’s Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations, India lacks detailed criteria that specify which licensing limitations are acceptable and which may be anti-competitive, even though the Competition Act acknowledges that IP rights may justify certain limits. Businesses risk uncertainty in the lack of such guidelines, and enforcement frequently relies on case-by-case interpretation, producing inconsistent results.

10.2 Overlap and Tension Between CCI and IP Authorities:

The ambiguity around whether royalty terms, patent validity, and FRAND issues belong under the authority of the CCI or remain solely with IP offices and courts is highlighted by the jurisdictional conflict seen in SEP cases, such as Ericsson. This leads to inconsistent criteria for evaluating licensing behaviour, forum shopping, and procedural delays.

10.3 Limited Assessment of Innovation and Technology Markets:

Traditionally, product and geographic markets have been the focus of Indian competition enforcement. However, IP-heavy industries need to assess dynamic efficiency, R&D alternatives, and innovation markets. It is challenging for CCI to evaluate how licensing restrictions impact long-term innovation incentives due to a lack of analytical tools and industry knowledge.

10.4 Need for Sector-Specific Guidance in Digital and High-Technology Markets:

Complex IP-competition challenges including interoperability, data access, patent accumulation, and network effects are brought up by digital platforms, algorithms, standardised technologies, and data-driven ecosystems. Businesses are more apprehensive and may be discouraged from innovating if there is no clear guidance on how competition law applies in digital and IP-dense industries.

11. Recommendations and way Forward:

11.1 Issue Comprehensive CCI Guidelines on IPR and Competition:

India desperately needs a specific framework that clarifies acceptable licensing restrictions, safe harbours, and analytical tools for evaluating IP-related behaviour. This framework should resemble the EU’s TTBER or the US DOJ–FTC IP Guidelines. Both right holders and licensees would benefit from clear standards for assessing grant-back clauses, tying, territorial restrictions, royalty practices, and licence refusals.

11.2 Establish Standards for Assessing Excessive Royalties and FRAND Compliance:
The lack of established procedures to determine just royalties in SEP and technology licensing disputes encourages litigation and inconsistent decisions. Transparent standards for FRAND decisions, such as non-discrimination principles, royalty base regulations, and methods for determining fair rates, should be adopted by India.

11.3 Develop Sector-Specific Guidance for Digital, Telecom, and Pharma Markets:
Sector standards would offer clarity given the particular difficulties in IP-heavy industries, such as interoperability, algorithmic control, data access, and patent thickets. Rules pertaining to platform licensing, mandatory access to crucial digital interfaces, and circumstances in which refusing to license digital tools may be considered abuse are some examples of this.

11.4 Build Technical Expertise and Capacity within CCI:

Specialised understanding of technology marketplaces, standards, innovation economics, and patent valuation is necessary for complex IP licensing disputes. To enhance its capacity to evaluate innovative markets and dynamic competition harms, the CCI should make investments in technical staff, expert panels, and long-term training.

11.5 Introduce Safe Harbors for Legitimate Licensing Practices:

India can establish safe harbours for pro-competitive licensing agreements, such as non-exclusive licenses, cross-licenses for interoperability, and reasonable grant-back obligations, to promote cooperation and lower compliance risk and ensure that innovation is not deterred by fear of antitrust scrutiny.

11.6 Promote Transparency and Fair Access in Innovation Ecosystems:

Open standards, clear license terms, and equitable technology access should be encouraged by policymakers, particularly for MSMEs and start-ups. A competitive, innovation-driven economy will be supported by initiatives that lessen information asymmetry and promote cooperative invention.

12. Conclusion:

An ongoing effort to strike a balance between exclusivity and market justice is reflected in the link between intellectual property rights and competition law in India. This balance grows more crucial and sensitive as data, digital infrastructure, and proprietary technologies drive industries more and more. IPR should not be used as a tool for monopolistic exploitation or market foreclosure, even though it gives inventors the motivation and legal protection to develop. Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act offer a solid framework for dealing with discriminatory access, high royalty requests, anti-competitive licensing, and reluctance to license necessary technologies.

India is moving towards a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the IPR, competition interaction, as evidenced by judicial and regulatory developments, especially in SEP disputes, digital platform investigations, and restrictive licensing instances. However, there are still significant gaps. Innovators, right holders, and market entrants continue to face uncertainty due to the lack of clear licensing requirements, ambiguity surrounding FRAND related assessments, and recurrent jurisdictional issues between the CCI and IP authorities.

Therefore, a forward-looking framework needs to have institutional coordination, policy coherence, and legal clarity. Essential initiatives include sector-specific guidelines for digital and high-technology markets, specified safe harbours for lawful licensing, transparent FRAND standards, and improved technical knowledge within regulatory bodies. India can guarantee the growth of both innovation and competition by coordinating innovation incentives with ethical market practices. In the end, a harmonised interface between IPR and competition legislation will protect consumer welfare, bolster India’s innovation ecosystem, and facilitate its rise to prominence in the world of technology and knowledge-based sectors.