BY SHIVAM PATEL, B.A.LL.B (HONS.), FACULTY OF LAW, C M P degree College Affiliated to University of Allahabad.
Abstract
In the realm of civil litigation under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), pleadings form the foundational framework of a case. They are the written statements—plaints by plaintiffs and written statements by defendants—that outline the facts, claims, and defences. Pleadings ensure that both parties are aware of the issues at hand, allowing for a fair trial. However, not all pleadings are constructive. Some may be irrelevant, abusive, or designed merely to prolong proceedings without merit. To address such issues, Order VI Rule 16 of the CPC empowers courts to strike out or amend pleadings that hinder justice. This provision is particularly crucial in dealing with frivolous defences, which are groundless claims raised by defendants to delay or complicate the trial. Courts approach this power cautiously, as striking off a defence is a drastic measure that can deny a party the opportunity to present their case. This article explores the scope of Order VI Rule 16, with a focus on how Indian courts handle frivolous defences, drawing on judicial interpretations and landmark cases.
Understanding Pleadings in Civil Procedure:
Pleadings are governed by Order VI of the CPC, which mandates that they must contain material facts but not evidence. The objective is to define the controversy clearly, prevent surprises during trial, and enable the court to frame issues accurately. A defence, as part of the written statement, must respond to the plaintiff’s claims and may include set-offs, counterclaims, or affirmative defences. However, if a defence is frivolous—meaning it lacks any reasonable basis, is patently groundless, or is raised solely to harass the opponent—it undermines the judicial process. Such defences waste court time, increase costs, and prejudice the plaintiff. Order VI Rule 16 serves as a safeguard against this, allowing courts to intervene at any stage of the proceedings.
The Text of Order VI Rule 16 CPC
Order VI Rule 16 reads as follows:
“The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading—
(a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious, or
(b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass, or delay the fair trial of the suit, or
(c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.”
This rule grants discretionary power to the court, exercisable Suo motu or on application by a party. It applies to both plaints and defences, ensuring that only relevant and bona fide pleadings proceed to trial.
Grounds for Striking off Pleadings:
The rule specifies three broad grounds, each addressing different forms of improper pleadings:
1. Unnecessary, Scandalous, Frivolous, or Vexatious (Clause a):
– Unnecessary: Allegations irrelevant to the relief sought or the issues in dispute. For instance, historical facts unrelated to the current claim may be struck out.
– Scandalous: Statements that are indecent, offensive, or defamatory without being necessary for the case. The court must assess if they are legally scandalous and essential to the relief.
– Frivolous: Pleadings without any reasonable cause of action or defence, often groundless or fanciful. This is the core focus when dealing with defences that lack merit.
– Vexatious: Claims intended to annoy or harass the opponent, such as repetitive or baseless assertions.
2. Tendency to Prejudice, Embarrass, or Delay Fair Trial (Clause b):
– This covers pleadings that confuse issues, introduce extraneous matters, or prolong the trial unnecessarily, thereby embarrassing the opposing party or delaying justice.
3. Abuse of the Process of the Court (Clause c):
– A wider ground encompassing any misuse of judicial machinery, such as filing defences to evade liability or exploit procedural loopholes.
These grounds are distinct but overlapping, and the court must exercise this power judiciously, based on rational principles.
Focus on Frivolous Defences: Definition and Identification
A frivolous defence is one that is clearly untenable, lacking any arguable basis in law or fact. It may be raised to obfuscate the real issues, inflate litigation costs, or buy time. Courts identify frivolity by examining whether, assuming the facts alleged are true, the defence could succeed. If it is patently hopeless, it qualifies for striking off.
For example, in election petitions or commercial suits, defences alleging vague conspiracies without specifics are often deemed frivolous. The threshold is high: the court must be convinced that the defence is “manifestly groundless” and not merely weak.
Procedure for Striking off Pleadings
An application under Order VI Rule 16 can be filed at any stage—before issues are framed, during trial, or even post-judgment if necessary. The court may act on its own if the defect is apparent. Notice is typically given to the affected party, allowing them to respond. If struck off, the pleading (or part thereof) is removed from the record, potentially leading to judgment on the remaining issues. Appeals lie against such orders under Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC. Costs may be imposed on the party raising frivolous defences to deter abuse.
How Courts Deal with Frivolous Defences: Judicial Approach and Caution
Indian courts emphasize that striking off is an “extraordinary” and “drastic” remedy, to be used sparingly. The preference is for cases to be decided on merits after full trial, unless the defence is so palpably frivolous that proceeding would be futile. This balanced approach prevents injustice while curbing misuse.
– Discretion and Circumspection: In Ajay Arjun Singh v. Sharadendu Tiwari (2016), the Supreme Court examined the scheme of Order VI Rule 16 in an election petition context. It held that the power must be exercised with care, ensuring parties can present their case intelligibly without embarrassment. The Court dismissed an application to strike out paragraphs, noting that defences require evidence to refute, not summary deletion unless clearly falling under the clauses
– Drastic Nature: In Abdul Razak v. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle (2010), the Supreme Court stressed that striking off defences should not be routine; courts should Favor merits-based decisions. In a maintenance arrears case, the defence was not struck off despite non-payment, as it would unduly penalize the respondent.
– Inherent Powers Beyond Rule 16: In Jayasree v. Vivekanandan (2011), the Kerala High Court upheld striking off a defence in a family dispute for wilful non-payment of maintenance. While Order VI Rule 16 was invoked, the Court relied on inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to enforce compliance, distinguishing it from routine striking off for frivolity. This illustrates that courts may go beyond the rule to prevent abuse, especially in cases of disobedience.
– Application in Election Petitions: In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi (1986), an election petition challenging Rajiv Gandhi’s win was dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 for lacking material facts, but the judgment referenced Order VI Rule 16 principles. The Supreme Court underscored that vague, frivolous allegations without specifics justify summary dismissal to avoid wasting judicial time.
– Recent Illustrations: In Yogesh Kumar v. Davender Kumar Relan (2023), the Delhi High Court struck out scandalous contentions in a written statement under Order VI Rule 16, imposing costs for abuse of process
Similarly, in Mrs. A. Sreedevi v. M/S. Woolton Design Private Limited (2017), the court affirmed the power to strike out unnecessary or frivolous matters at any stage. Courts often impose exemplary costs on parties raising frivolous defences, as seen in a 2023 Delhi High Court case where costs were levied for frivolous amendments. This deters future misconduct.
Landmark Judgments Illustrating Court Handling:
1. Ajay Arjun Singh v. Sharadendu Tiwari (2016): The Supreme Court refused to strike out allegations in an election petition, holding that defences must be tested on evidence unless patently frivolous. It clarified that Order VI Rule 16 aims to ensure intelligible pleadings without embarrassment.
2. Jayasree v. Vivekanandan (2011): In a matrimonial dispute, the defence was struck off for non-compliance with interim orders. The Kerala High Court distinguished Order VI Rule 16 from inherent powers, using the latter to enforce justice.
3. Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi (1986): Though primarily under Order VII Rule 11, the case applied similar principles, dismissing a frivolous election petition for lacking specifics, emphasizing the need to terminate meaningless litigation early.
4. Abdul Razak v. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle (2010): The Supreme Court cautioned against hasty striking off, preferring trials on merits unless the defence is clearly vexatious.
5. Davy v. Garrett (1878, cited in Indian cases): An early reference highlighting that embarrassing pleadings can be struck off if they prejudice fair trial
Conclusion:
Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), stands as a cornerstone mechanism in Indian civil jurisprudence, designed to preserve the sanctity of judicial proceedings by empowering courts to excise pleadings that are frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise obstructive to the administration of justice. This provision is not merely a procedural tool but a bulwark against the proliferation of baseless defences that burden an already overburdened judiciary, inflate litigation costs, and erode public confidence in the legal system. By allowing courts to strike out or amend unnecessary, scandalous, or abusive elements in pleadings at any stage, it ensures that only meritorious claims and defences proceed to trial, aligning with the overarching objectives of the CPC: expeditious, fair, and cost-effective dispute resolution.
The judicial approach to frivolous defences under this rule has been consistently marked by restraint and circumspection, as evidenced by a lineage of landmark decisions. Courts have reiterated that striking off a defence is an extraordinary remedy, to be invoked only when the pleading is manifestly groundless or constitutes an abuse of process, rather than as a shortcut to bypass a full trial on merits. For instance, historical precedents like Abdul Razak v. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle (2010) and Ajay Arjun Singh v. Sharadendu Tiwari (2016) underscore the preference for evidence-based adjudication unless the defence is patently untenable. This caution stems from the fundamental right to a fair hearing under Article 21 of the Constitution, ensuring that litigants are not prematurely deprived of their opportunity to defend.
Recent judgments from 2024 and 2025 further illuminate this balanced methodology, demonstrating the rule’s evolving application in diverse contexts such as land acquisition disputes, election petitions, and matrimonial cases. In Jos Chiramel v. National Highways Authority of India (2024), the Kerala High Court elaborated on the grounds for striking out pleadings, emphasizing that lengthy or irrelevant assertions can prejudice fair trial, thereby justifying intervention under Clause (b) of the rule. Similarly, in Sayed Alli Zulfuqar v. Sk Zehed Hossain (2024), the court affirmed that applications under Order VI Rule 16 can be entertained even post-trial commencement, reinforcing the provision’s flexibility to address emerging abuses.
Moving into 2025, cases like Thirugnanasambandhar Adheena Madam v. Mr. Ramakrishnan highlight the appellate scrutiny under Article 227 against orders striking off pleadings, where the Madras High Court clarified that such powers must be exercised judiciously, entertaining applications sequentially to avoid procedural irregularities. In Madhab Dhada v. Parshuram Dhada (2025), the Orissa High Court delved into the prerequisites for striking out, ruling that only matters clearly falling within the rule’s clauses—such as those unnecessary or tending to delay—warrant removal, thereby preventing overreach.d4a08e Election-related frivolity was addressed in Afr Kishore Kumar Nayak v. Byomkesh (2025), where the court linked Order VI Rule 16 with Order VII Rule 11, advocating for early termination of groundless petitions to conserve judicial resources.55ec03 Additionally, in Mr. Venugopal Krishnamurthy v. Smt M Tejaswini (2025), the Karnataka High Court struck off a defence in a civil suit, underscoring the rule’s role in enforcing compliance with interim orders. These contemporary rulings also reveal a growing trend towards integrating Order VI Rule 16 with inherent powers under Section 151 CPC, particularly in cases involving defiance of court directives, such as non-payment of rent or maintenance.
References:
- http://www.lawgratis.com/blog-detail/order-6-rule-16-cpc
- https://www.lawweb.in/2017/10/basic-principles-to-be-followed-by_19.html
- https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-iii-pleadings-and-motions/rule-8-general-rules-of-pleading
- https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/vexatious_litigation
- https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5bd45be69eff430a642478c4
- https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/indian-supreme-court-sets-aside-2112336
- https://www.casemine.com/search/in/striking%252Boff%252Bpleadings
- https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/frivolous
- https://www.upcounsel.com/legal-def-notice
