This Case Analysis has been written by Manshi Raj, BBA – LL.B 3rd Year Student of Usha Martin University, Ranchi, Jharkhand during her internship at LeDroit India .
Introduction
The decision in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) is a milestone judgment of the Supreme Court of India that examined the definition of a “wife” within Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973, and whether a woman in a live-in relationship could claim maintenance under this provision. The court’s inquiry focused on live-in relationships being legally recognised to determine the rights of women in this type of living arrangement, and thus this case became precedent for future cases of maintenance claims by women in informal relationships.
Facts of the Case
D. Patchaiammal asserted that she had lived with D. Velusamy for some years and that he later deserted her without providing financial assistance. She filed a petition in the Court under Section 125 of the CrPC, seeking maintenance. D. Velusamy argued that he was married to another woman and disputed the idea that his relationship with Patchaiammal could be treated as a marriage. The lower courts heard evidence and found in favour of Patchaiammal by providing her maintenance, which prompted Velusamy to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issues of the Case
- Is a woman in a live-in relationship entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC ?
- What is meant by a “relationship in the nature of marriage” as per the law ?
- Did the respondent, D. Patchaiammal, qualifies as a “wife” under Section 125 of the CrPC ?
Arguments by Both Parties ➖
Arguments by the Petitioner (D. Velusamy) :
The petitioner, D. Velusamy in his petition mentioned that he was legally wedded to another woman and that D. Patchaiammal could never be regarded as his lawful wife. He further stated that, as there was no marriage Ramanathan and the respondent made a desire between them, the petitioner was not liable to pay maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC. He contended that their relationship was not comparable to a marriage and their relationship did not satisfy the requirement of law.
Arguments by the Respondent (D. Patchaiammal) :
The respondent, D. Patchaiammal, asserted that she had been a couple with the petitioner for several years and had been left by him without any financial support. Patchaiammal contended that her relationship with the petitioner should be considered as “a relationship in the nature of marriage,” and that she is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC meant to avoid starvation and protect women in particular from starvation.
Final Judgment
The Supreme Court decided in favor of D. Velusamy, the petitioner before it, and determined that not every live-in relationship will be considered as a “relationship in the nature of marriage” which would, in turn, allow for a maintenance claim to be made against the other party under Section 125 of the CrPC. The court laid down some essential requirements which must be satisfied in order for a live-in relationship to be deemed a de facto marriage :
- The couple must have lived together in a manner akin to that of a husband and wife.
- The relationship must be of considerable length.
- The parties must have presented themselves to the public as husband and wife.
- The couple must be legally capable of marrying.
- The relationship should not be a casual affair but must have some degree of permanence and commitment.
The court added clarification regarding a situation where a woman was in a “relationship in the nature of marriage” would be entitled to maintenance. However, if a woman is in a casual or adulterous relationship, she wouldn’t be entitled to maintenance. Ms. D. Patchaiammal could not prove that her relationship with Mr. D. Velusamy met the satisfactions of being a “relationship in the nature of marriage”; therefore, her claim for maintenance was rejected.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court case D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) offered a noteworthy interpretation of Section 125 of CrPC relating to live-in relationships. The Court articulated that a woman is entitled to maintenance only in those relationships which are quasi-marriage like. The conclusion emphasized that live-in relationships give rise to some legal protections for women, but not all live-in relationships will automatically entitle them to the same protections granted to the legally married. The case demonstrates the need for clear legal recognition of live-in relationships in order to protect marginalized women from financial hardship. The case sets the groundwork for future maintenance claims by women in relationships that are not marital, and reinforces the burden of proof with respect to establishing a stable relationship that operates similarly to marriage in order to be eligible for maintenance privileges under the law.
