This article is written by Anmol Singhal, Bharati Vidyapeeth (Deemed to be University) New Law College, Pune, B.A LL.B, 4th Year during his internship at LeDroit India
Abstract
The case of Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903) remains one of the most consequential judgments in Indian contract law, establishing the foundational principle that contracts entered into by minors are void from inception (ab initio) and cannot be enforced in any circumstance. When Dharmodas Ghose, a minor, mortgaged his immovable property for Rs. 20,000 at twelve percent annual interest to Brahmo Dutta, the moneylender was fully aware of his minority status through his agent Kedar Nath. Upon attaining majority, Dharmodas challenged the mortgage as void due to his incapacity at the time of execution. The Privy Council’s landmark judgment affirmed that minors possess no contractual capacity whatsoever under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, rejecting contentions that the law of estoppel should operate against the minor and clarifying that restitution principles do not apply to agreements that are void from their very inception. This decision established binding precedent that continues to shape Indian jurisprudence concerning contractual capacity, the age of majority, and the protective mechanisms embedded within contract law to safeguard vulnerable populations from exploitation through apparently consensual but fundamentally incapacitous agreements.
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY AND MINORS IN LAW
The question of whether young persons should be bound by agreements they voluntarily enter into has troubled legal minds for centuries. Most functioning legal systems recognise an intuitive tension: the law generally enforces agreements because contract provides the mechanism through which voluntary exchanges of value occur, yet minors—precisely those who need protection most often possess neither the cognitive development nor life experience to fully comprehend the legal consequences of their commitments. How should law navigate this paradox?
The case under examination addresses this fundamental tension. Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on 4th March 1903, represents the judicial resolution of one of contract law’s most enduring questions: are agreements involving minors simply unenforceable at the minor’s option, or are they fundamentally void from inception? The answer the Privy Council provided transformed Indian contract jurisprudence by establishing that contracts with minors are void ab initio- void from their very beginning, and consequently wholly incapable of enforcement irrespective of the minor’s subsequent conduct or the other party’s reliance interests.
This judgment has become so foundational to Indian contract law that practitioners, judges, and scholars treat the principle as almost self-evident. Yet examining the case reveals a more nuanced story: the Privy Council did not merely apply existing statutory provisions but rather deployed interpretative techniques to resolve genuine ambiguity in Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The judgment prioritised protective policy over economic efficiency, recognising that permitting contracts with minors to be voidable rather than void would create moral hazard whereby unscrupulous merchants might deliberately transact with minors, secure in the knowledge that only the minor possessed termination rights.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK: THE STATUTORY ARCHITECTURE GOVERNING CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY
Before examining the case facts and reasoning, understanding the statutory provisions governing contractual capacity is essential. The Indian Contract Act, 1872 represents codification of contractual principles applicable throughout the British Indian dominions. Section 2(h) defines a contract as “an agreement enforceable by law”—a deceptively simple formulation that raised fundamental interpretative questions when applied to agreements involving minors.
Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act states broadly that “all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of the parties competent to contract.” The provision establishes that contractual validity requires both: (i) free consent of the parties, and (ii) competency to contract. The Act does not elaborate on what “free consent” requires or what constitutes competency. However, Section 11 addresses the latter element directly, specifying: “Every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority according to the law to which he is subject, and who is of sound mind and is not disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject.”
Section 11 identifies three elements of contractual competency. First, attainment of the age of majority according to applicable law. The Indian Majority Act, 1875 provides the definitive standard: a person attains majority upon completing eighteen years of age, or upon completing twenty-one years of age if a guardian has been court-appointed. Thus, statutory law establishes a bright-line rule: persons under eighteen years of age (or twenty-one if under guardianship) are minors, presumptively lacking capacity to enter binding agreements.
Second, contractual capacity requires that the party be “of sound mind.” The Act does not elaborate extensively on this requirement but generally refers to freedom from mental incapacity or insanity that would prevent comprehension of contractual terms. This element is largely uncontroversial; the genuine interpretative difficulty centred on the implications of minority status.
Third, the Act specifies that no law should disqualify the party from contracting. This provision contemplates that besides age and mental capacity, statutory provisions might restrict contractual capacity for particular persons- convicts, undischarged bankrupts, married women (in the case law era when such restrictions existed), and others. This third element proved subsidiary to the case at hand.
The crucial ambiguity in Section 11, which the Mohori Bibee case ultimately resolved, concerned the nature of a contract involving a minor. Does Section 11 render such contracts void, voidable, or something else? The Act’s language is silent on this point, creating interpretative space that prior Indian courts had filled inconsistently, with some following English common law precedent treating minors’ contracts as voidable at the minor’s option, whilst others suggested such contracts were wholly void.
Sections 64 and 65 of the Indian Contract Act address remedies when contracts become void. Section 64 provides that “if a person at whose option a contract is voidable rescinds it, the other party need not perform, nor shall he be liable to perform, any promise contained in it.” Section 65 addresses restitution, providing: “When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it.”
The relationship between these provisions and the capacity of minors proved legally consequential. If minors’ contracts were voidable but not void, meaning they could be ratified once the minor attained majority—then Sections 64 and 65 would presumably apply, requiring parties to restore benefits upon rescission. Conversely, if minors’ contracts were void from inception, then arguably Sections 64 and 65 would not apply, as those sections address remedies when valid contracts become void or when voidable contracts are rescinded. A contract that was never validly formed would be beyond the reach of restitution provisions.
This interpretative puzzle formed the genuine legal question in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose.
CASE ANALYSIS
FACTS: THE MORTGAGE AND THE MINOR
The foundational facts were straightforward, though their legal implications proved complex. On 10th September 1895, Dharmodas Ghose and his mother initiated legal proceedings against Brahmo Dutta, a moneylender, seeking cancellation of a mortgage deed executed by Dharmodas over his immovable property. The mortgage was executed for a sum of Rs. 20,000 at twelve percent annual interest.
The critical fact distinguishing this case from routine mortgage disputes was Dharmodas’s age at the time of mortgage execution. Dharmodas Ghose was a minor- legally incompetent to contract at the moment the mortgage was executed. Neither Dharmodas nor his mother challenged the accuracy of his minority status. Rather, this fact formed the foundation of their legal complaint.
The moneylender’s side of the transaction proved equally clear. Brahmo Dutta conducted moneylending operations, yet delegated management of his business affairs to his agent, Kedar Nath. Significantly, the evidence established that Kedar Nath, acting as Brahmo Dutta’s representative- had actual knowledge of Dharmodas’s minority status at the time the mortgage deed was negotiated and executed. This knowledge was particularly relevant because it would later become decisive in defeating the moneylender’s principal defence.
After the mortgage was executed, Dharmodas remained subject to the debt obligation, with the mortgaged property standing as security for the Rs. 20,000 principal and accruing interest. For approximately eight years, the debt remained in this status until Dharmodas attained his majority. Upon attaining majority, rather than ratifying the mortgage or taking steps to formally discharge the debt, Dharmodas elected to challenge the mortgage’s validity, contending that his minority at execution rendered the instrument wholly void.
The procedural history demonstrates how the case traversed the Indian court system. The trial court, presumably the District Court where the mortgage property was situated, heard evidence on the facts and the applicable law. The court concluded that Dharmodas’s minority at the time of mortgage execution rendered the mortgage void, making it unenforceable and subject to cancellation. The mortgage deed was accordingly cancelled.
Brahmo Dutta, dissatisfied with this outcome, appealed to the Calcutta High Court. The High Court upheld the trial court’s decision, affirming that the mortgage was void due to Dharmodas’s minority and dismissing Brahmo Dutta’s appeal. However, this was not the final stage, as the case proceeded further to the apex jurisdiction.
Following the Calcutta High Court’s judgment, Brahmo Dutta’s executors (Brahmo Dutta himself having died during litigation) appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—the highest appellate authority in the British Indian Empire and the final court of appeal for significant cases. The Privy Council accepted the appeal, suggesting it recognised genuine legal significance and interpretative difficulty in the case, rather than treating it as a clear application of settled law.
LEGAL ISSUES: THE CORE QUESTIONS
The case raised three fundamental issues that required judicial resolution. First, the central question: Was the mortgage deed void under Section 2(h), Section 10, and Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872? This issue required the court to determine whether the Act rendered Dharmodas’s agreement wholly void, voidable at the minor’s option, or something intermediate. The framing of this question proved decisive because different answers would produce radically different legal consequences.
Second, the case raised questions concerning whether the defendant—Dharmodas—was liable to return the loan amount he had received. This issue implicated restitution principles and addressed whether Dharmodas could receive the benefit of the loan without compensating Brahmo Dutta for the advance. The practical importance of this issue cannot be understated: if minors could retain borrowed sums without obligation to repay, the moneylending profession would become economically irrational for transactions involving minors.
Third, the case addressed whether the mortgage should be characterised as voidable (meaning cancellable at the minor’s option) or something else. This characterisation issue was closely related to the first question but framed differently: the issue was not merely whether the contract was void or voidable, but what legal category best captured its status.
ARGUMENTS: THE COMPETING CONTENTIONS
The Plaintiff’s (Dharmodas’s) Contentions:
Dharmodas’s legal team advanced a straightforward argument rooted in statutory interpretation. They argued that Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act rendered minors incompetent to contract. The language of Section 10- that “all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of the parties competent to contract”—created a logical consequence: if a party is incompetent to contract due to minority, then the agreement cannot be a “contract” within the meaning of the Act at all. This logical reading suggested that minors’ agreements were fundamentally incapable of achieving contractual status, making them void from inception rather than merely voidable.
Dharmodas’s counsel further contended that protective policy supported this interpretation. Allowing minors’ contracts to be merely voidable would create incentives for unscrupulous merchants to deliberately transact with minors, knowing that only the minor could enforce termination rights. The other party would retain enforcement rights, creating asymmetrical risk allocation that undermined the protective purpose of minority status. A minor who wished to enforce a contract could do so; a minor who wished to escape could escape. This asymmetry would paradoxically punish minors by encouraging exploitation.
Moreover, Dharmodas’s counsel argued that even if the mortgage could initially be characterised as voidable, Dharmodas’s youth and lack of legal sophistication prevented him from understanding the consequences of ratification versus explicit renewal upon attaining majority. The law’s protective instinct suggested that contracts should not be automatically ratified merely by the minor’s silence after attaining majority, nor should minors bear the burden of making affirmative acts to disaffirm. Rather, the presumption should protect the minor.
The Respondent’s (Brahmo Dutta’s Executors’) Contentions:
Brahmo Dutta’s legal representatives offered several defences. First, they contended that whilst Dharmodas was technically a minor, he had fraudulently misrepresented his age to Brahmo Dutta’s agent, claiming to be of majority age. If this factual assertion proved correct, then the law of estoppel should operate to prevent Dharmodas from using his minority as a defence. Under estoppel principles, a party who deliberately misrepresents a material fact should not be permitted to deny the truth of that representation, particularly where the other party has relied upon it to their detriment.
The respondents pointed out that Dharmodas had specifically made representations regarding his age to Kedar Nath, Brahmo Dutta’s agent. They had relied upon these representations to advance Rs. 20,000, a substantial sum, to Dharmodas. Brahmo Dutta had altered his position in reliance on the apparent capacity of the other party. To allow Dharmodas to now claim minority, after receiving and presumably benefiting from the loan funds, would constitute unconscionable conduct that equity should not countenance.
Second, Brahmo Dutta’s executors argued that even if the mortgage were void, restitution principles embodied in Sections 64 and 65 of the Indian Contract Act should apply. These sections recognised that when an agreement becomes void, the parties should be restored to their pre-contractual positions. Dharmodas had received Rs. 20,000 in loan funds. Equity and fairness demanded that he return this sum, or if return of the precise funds was impossible, provide compensation. To allow Dharmodas to retain the benefit of the loan whilst escaping all obligation would constitute unjust enrichment—precisely what restitution doctrine existed to prevent.
The respondents thus articulated a fundamental tension between protective policy (preventing minors from binding themselves) and economic fairness (preventing minors from retaining benefits without reciprocal obligation). They argued that the law should accommodate both principles: minors would not be bound by their contract, but neither would they be permitted to retain benefits received without making restitution.
Third, the respondents contended that Kedar Nath’s knowledge of Dharmodas’s minority, even if accepted as fact, should not defeat the respondent’s claims. They argued that the moneylender had nonetheless provided valuable consideration—the Rs. 20,000 advance—and that this consideration should be protected regardless of the parties’ respective knowledge of Dharmodas’s capacity status.
THE PRIVY COUNCIL’S JUDGMENT AND REASONING
The Privy Council’s decision, delivered by Lord North, addressed each of these contentions systematically and rejected most of the respondents’ arguments. The judgment is most notable for what it established definitively and what it left unresolved.
On the Nature of Minors’ Contracts:
Lord North began by addressing the fundamental question: are contracts with minors void or merely voidable? The Privy Council held definitively that such contracts are void ab initio-void from their very inception.
Lord North’s reasoning proceeded from statutory interpretation. The Act, in Section 11, establishes that contracting capacity requires attainment of majority. Section 10, in turn, states that “all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of the parties competent to contract.” The logical inference from these provisions, his Lordship reasoned, was that agreements by parties incompetent to contract cannot become contracts within the meaning of the Act. “The Act makes it essential that all the contracting parties should be competent to contract and expressly provides that a person who by reason of infancy is incompetent to contract cannot make a contract within the meaning of the Act.”
This reasoning proved crucial. Lord North was not saying that minors’ agreements lack effect because of some equitable doctrine; rather, he was saying that such agreements fail to achieve the status of “contract” as defined by the statute. A void ab initio agreement is one that never achieves legal validity; it is a nullity from inception, not a valid contract that has been subsequently rescinded or cancelled.
The distinction between void and voidable contracts proved legally significant. Voidable contracts are valid contracts that one party may elect to rescind or cancel. Void contracts lack validity from inception and are incapable of binding either party. The Privy Council’s classification of minors’ contracts as void ab initio meant they could not be ratified even after the minor attained majority. A contract that was void from inception cannot become valid merely because one party now possesses capacity. The invalidity is permanent, not contingent on the minor’s age.
On the Doctrine of Estoppel:
The respondents’ primary defence- that estoppel should prevent Dharmodas from denying capacity, received short shrift from the Privy Council. Lord North held that the doctrine of estoppel does not operate against minors when they deny their own incapacity.
The Privy Council’s reasoning on this point emphasised the factual context. Kedar Nath, Brahmo Dutta’s agent, had actual knowledge of Dharmodas’s minority status prior to the mortgage being executed. The evidence established that this knowledge was documented and communicated explicitly. Given that Kedar Nath knew the real facts that Dharmodas was indeed a minor- any misrepresentation Dharmodas might have made about his age was made to a person who knew the statement to be false.
Lord North referenced Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, which addresses estoppel: “A person, who by deed or words, intentionally causes, or knowingly and willingly suffers, another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, shall not, in any action or proceeding affecting such person, be permitted to deny the truth of that thing.”
The Privy Council held that this provision should be interpreted contextually. Where both parties know the truth, the doctrine of estoppel cannot operate: “There can be no estoppel where the truth of the matter is known to both the parties, and their Lordships hold, that a false representation, made to a person who knows it to be false, is not such a fraud as to take away the privilege of infancy.”
This reasoning proved radical. It meant that even if Dharmodas had deliberately and fraudulently misrepresented his age, the misrepresentation would not bind him if the moneylender’s agent knew the truth. The privilege of infancy—the legal protection afforded to minors—could not be waived or taken away through fraud. This reflected a strong policy choice: the law would protect minors even against their own fraudulent conduct, precisely because minors lack the judgment to bind themselves even when attempting to do so deliberately.
On Restitution and Section 64-65:
The respondents’ secondary defence- that restitution principles should require Dharmodas to return the Rs. 20,000 loan advance, was also rejected by the Privy Council, though on more nuanced grounds.
The Privy Council held that Sections 64 and 65 of the Indian Contract Act do not apply to agreements that are void ab initio. These sections address remedies when valid contracts become void or when voidable contracts are rescinded. However, if an agreement was never a valid contract to begin with- if it was void from inception- then Sections 64 and 65 have no application.
Lord North reasoned that restitution provisions presuppose a valid contract that has been subsequently displaced or rescinded. If the underlying agreement lacks contractual status altogether, the question of restoring benefits does not arise in the same manner. The restitution provisions assume agreement formation followed by termination; they do not address situations where agreement formation failed entirely.
This holding created a stark consequence: Dharmodas retained the benefit of the Rs. 20,000 loan without legal obligation to repay. The moneylender received neither repayment nor enforcement rights against the mortgaged property. The loss fell entirely on the moneylender, which the Privy Council accepted as the appropriate policy consequence of transacting with a known minor.
It should be noted that the Privy Council’s rejection of restitution in cases of void ab initio minors’ contracts did not mean restitution could never apply in any circumstance involving minors. Rather, the judgment established that where an agreement fails to achieve contractual status due to minority, restitution does not follow automatically. However, subsequent judicial development established that minors do bear quasi-contractual liability for necessaries supplied under Section 68 of the Indian Contract Act, which provides an alternative remedy for suppliers of necessary goods and services to minors.
JUDGMENT: THE HOLDING AND DISPOSITION
The Privy Council’s judgment conclusively answered the legal questions posed by the case:
First, the mortgage deed was void under Sections 2(h), 10, and 11 of the Indian Contract Act. The agreement failed to achieve contractual status because Dharmodas lacked contractual capacity due to his minority. No amount of subsequent ratification or reliance by the other party could cure this fundamental defect.
Second, Dharmodas was not liable to return the loan amount despite retaining the Rs. 20,000 advance. The restitution provisions of Sections 64 and 65 did not apply to void ab initio contracts. The moneylender’s remedy, if any, lay not in contract law but potentially in other doctrines (such as quasi-contractual liability for necessaries, if the funds constituted necessaries for Dharmodas’s maintenance).
Third, the mortgage was not merely voidable but wholly void. The characterisation of the agreement as void ab initio rather than voidable meant that Dharmodas’s legal status did not change upon attaining majority. The agreement remained void because it had always been void.
As to disposition: The Privy Council upheld the decisions of the trial court and Calcutta High Court, affirming that the mortgage deed should be cancelled and that Dharmodas retained no obligation to repay the loan funds.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS: BALANCING PROTECTION AND FAIRNESS
The Mohori Bibee judgment represents a masterful but not uncomplicated resolution of fundamental tensions in contract law. The decision prioritised protection of minors from exploitation yet created countervailing injustices that subsequent jurisprudence has sought to address.
THE PROTECTIVE RATIONALE: JUSTIFYING VOID AB INITIO STATUS
The Privy Council’s choice to classify minors’ contracts as void ab initio rather than voidable reflects a coherent protective philosophy. Minors, by definition, lack the cognitive development, life experience, and emotional maturity necessary to comprehend fully the legal consequences of contractual commitments. The prefrontal cortex- the brain region governing judgment and consequence-assessment—continues developing into the mid-twenties. Setting the age of majority at eighteen necessarily involves an arbitrary chronological line, knowing that developmental capacity varies significantly among individuals.
Given this reality, law faces a choice: should it permit minors to bind themselves, trusting that marketplace mechanisms and cooling-off periods will prevent serious harm? Or should it categorically protect minors from binding themselves, accepting that this protection will sometimes shield minors from beneficial arrangements they deliberately pursued?
The Privy Council chose categorical protection. This choice reflects an assumption that asymmetric information and cognitive limitations make minors particularly vulnerable to manipulation. A sophisticated adult merchant engaging with a minor possesses vastly superior information about the transaction’s consequences. The minor, lacking experience, cannot assess whether the terms are fair, whether alternatives exist, or whether the transaction serves their genuine interests.
Moreover, allowing minors’ contracts to be voidable rather than void creates perverse incentives. Merchants aware that only the minor can enforce termination rights might deliberately transact with minors, particularly for transactions involving immovable property or other items of value. The merchant retains enforcement rights whilst the minor possesses termination rights. This asymmetry would paradoxically harm minors by attracting predatory merchants.
The void ab initio approach eliminates this asymmetry. If neither party can enforce the agreement—if the contract is simply dead law from inception- then merchants have no incentive to deliberately target minors. The minor receives protection not through asymmetric enforcement rights but through categorical unenforceability.
INJUSTICE AND THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT PROBLEM
Yet the Mohori Bibee approach creates its own injustices. The judgment leaves minors free to retain benefits received under void agreements without reciprocal obligation. Dharmodas retained Rs. 20,000 whilst providing nothing in return. More broadly, if a merchant supplies necessaries to a minor in exchange for a promise to pay, the merchant receives nothing if the agreement is void ab initio.
This consequence troubled many subsequent jurists. The unfairness seems evident: a minor receives a benefit he sought, at terms to which he agreed, yet suffers no consequence when declining to honour his promise after attaining capacity. The merchant receives neither the promised payment nor recovery of the consideration provided.
The Privy Council acknowledged this tension but accepted it as the necessary cost of protecting minors. The judgment effectively concluded that the risk of minors retaining benefits without reciprocal obligation is preferable to the risk of minors being bound by agreements they did not fully understand. This reflects a judgment about which injustice is worse: enriching minors at merchants’ expense, or binding minors to disadvantageous agreements.
However, the rigidity of this approach has prompted subsequent legal developments. The most important is Section 68 of the Indian Contract Act, which addresses minors’ quasi-contractual liability for necessaries. This provision provides an alternative remedy for suppliers of necessaries to minors: whilst the contract may be void, the supplier can nonetheless recover the reasonable cost of necessaries provided, charged against the minor’s property. This mechanism balances protective concerns (the minor is not bound to an agreement and cannot be compelled to perform) with fairness concerns (the supplier is not left completely uncompensated).
ESTOPPEL AND THE FRAUD PARADOX
The Privy Council’s holding that estoppel cannot apply against minors, even when they have fraudulently misrepresented their age, created a conceptual puzzle that has troubled contract law scholars. The judgment essentially holds that minors possess an “infancy privilege” that cannot be waived even through the minor’s own fraud.
This holding reflects a coherent policy: the protective purpose of minority status would be undermined if minors could waive their protection through representations, whether truthful or fraudulent. Yet the result seems counterintuitive. Should the law really protect someone who has deliberately deceived the other party? Does rewarding fraud undermine the legitimacy of contract law’s protective apparatus?
Subsequent jurisprudence has developed more nuanced approaches. Whilst accepting that estoppel does not operate when the other party knew the true facts (as in Mohori Bibee), Indian courts have recognised situations where minors’ fraudulent misrepresentations might have consequences. For instance, if a minor fraudulently obtains credit by falsely claiming to be an adult, and the creditor reasonably relies on this misrepresentation without any means of discovering the truth, some courts have suggested that the minor might bear some liability—though likely not full contractual liability.
However, the weight of authority remains that minors’ fraud does not render them liable on the contract. The protection persists even when undeserved. This reflects a judgment that the bright-line protection is preferable to case-by-case assessment of fraud and reliance, which would necessarily involve difficult factual inquiries and risk inadequate protection for vulnerable minors.
THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE PROBLEM
The Mohori Bibee decision established that agreements with minors are not merely unenforceable through common law remedies (damages) but are wholly void, incapable of specific performance. A merchant cannot compel a minor to perform contractual obligations through specific performance decrees. This creates asymmetry in certain circumstances.
Consider a minor who agrees to sell immovable property. The minor can refuse to transfer despite receiving full payment. The adult purchaser cannot compel specific performance because the underlying contract is void. Yet the minor retains the purchase price received. This asymmetry, whilst protective of the minor, leaves the adult purchaser without meaningful remedy.
MODERN CRITIQUES AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
Contemporary developmental psychology and neuroscience have raised nuanced questions about the Mohori Bibee framework. If contractual incapacity stems from cognitive limitations and developmental immaturity, then the bright-line age of majority seems overly rigid. Significant cognitive variations exist among persons of identical chronological age. Moreover, certain minors—particularly older adolescents, possess sophisticated understanding of particular transactions relevant to their experience.
Some modern scholars argue that a more calibrated approach would distinguish among different types of contracts. Contracts concerning real property, commercial loans, and complex financial instruments might receive strict protective treatment. Contracts for necessaries, or within the minor’s area of expertise or special knowledge, might be treated differently. This would reject the rigid void ab initio approach in favour of more contextual assessment.
However, such refinement introduces uncertainty that would complicate merchant-minor transactions. Merchants would need to assess whether each transaction fell within categories deserving relaxed treatment. This uncertainty might itself deter legitimate transactions with minors. The bright-line rule, whilst inflexible, provides clarity and predictability that facilitates commerce.
IMPLICATIONS AND PRECEDENTIAL IMPACT
FOUNDATION FOR SECTION 11 JURISPRUDENCE
The Mohori Bibee decision settled interpretative ambiguity that had characterised pre-1903 Indian contract law. Prior to this judgment, courts had applied Section 11 inconsistently, with some treating minors’ contracts as voidable (following English precedent) and others suggesting void ab initio status. The Privy Council’s authoritative resolution established definitively that minors’ contracts are void ab initio under the Indian statutory framework.
This clarity proved immensely valuable. Courts applying Indian Contract Act provisions after 1903 could apply Section 11 with confidence, knowing that a contract involving a party who was a minor at execution was void from inception and incapable of ratification. Merchants could organise their affairs around this clear rule. Minors received unambiguous legal protection.
DISTINCTION FROM ENGLISH COMMON LAW
The Mohori Bibee decision importantly diverged from English common law approaches, which traditionally treated minors’ contracts as voidable at the minor’s option rather than wholly void. This divergence reflected genuine differences between statutory and common law approaches. English law, developed through case law interpretation and judicial innovation, had evolved doctrines balancing minor protection with merchant fairness. The Indian Contract Act, codified in statutory form, created interpretative rigidity that pushed Indian courts toward more categorical approaches.
The divergence proved consequential. English law ultimately recognised exceptions and developed doctrines permitting certain minors’ contracts to be enforceable, particularly for necessaries and contracts benefiting minors. The Mohori Bibee approach, being more categorical, required similar exceptions to be carved out through subsequent legislative amendment (Section 68) or judicial interpretation rather than emerging organically through case-law evolution.
EXCEPTIONS AND SUBSEQUENT REFINEMENT
Whilst establishing the void ab initio rule as the baseline principle, the Mohori Bibee decision acknowledged that exceptions exist. The judgment did not hold that all agreements involving minors are void ab initio without exception. Rather, it established void ab initio as the presumptive rule, with exceptions for certain categories of contracts.
The most important exception is for contracts concerning necessaries. Section 68 of the Indian Contract Act, discussed in the judgment, provides that if a person incompetent to contract (such as a minor) receives necessaries- goods required for subsistence, maintenance, or fulfillment of social station—the supplier may recover the reasonable cost of such necessaries from the minor’s property. This provision creates quasi-contractual liability independent of contract law principles. The minor is not bound to the underlying contract but remains liable for reasonable compensation.
The definition of “necessaries” proves contextual. Common examples include food, clothing, shelter, and education appropriate to the minor’s social station. However, luxury items, even if arguably beneficial to the minor, do not constitute necessaries. Courts have held that professional services (medical treatment, legal advice), apprenticeship training, and similar education-related services may constitute necessaries in appropriate contexts.
Beneficial agreements constitute another exception developed after Mohori Bibee. The case of Chinnaya v. Ramaya (1882) established that contracts made solely for a minor’s benefit, imposing no liabilities, may be enforceable against the minor. If an elderly relative executes a deed granting property to a minor, the minor cannot avoid the gift merely because of minority status. This exception recognises that protective concern for minors should not extend to agreements that benefit them unambiguously.
Contracts of apprenticeship and service constitute a third category recognised both in the Act and in common law. Apprenticeship agreements, typically involving a minor learning a trade under an adult master’s supervision, have historically received different treatment. Such agreements, if genuinely beneficial to the minor and entered into for purposes of skill acquisition, may be enforceable against the minor under Section 68 or general equitable principles.
AFTERMATH: NO RATIFICATION UPON ATTAINING MAJORITY
A particularly important implication established by Mohori Bibee concerns the irreversibility of void ab initio status. A minor cannot ratify a void ab initio contract by promising to perform it after attaining majority. The promise to ratify is treated as a new contract entered into after majority was attained—but it lacks consideration sufficient to render it enforceable.
This principle was tested and affirmed in Indran Ramaswamy v. Anthappa (1906), decided shortly after Mohori Bibee. In that case, a minor had executed a promissory note in consideration of an advance received during minority. After attaining majority, the minor executed a fresh promissory note in “settlement” of the earlier one, apparently attempting to ratify and reaffirm the minor-era obligation. The Privy Council held that this subsequent promise, whilst made with majority capacity, could not ratify the void ab initio agreement. The prior agreement had been void from inception; the new promise was merely an attempt to acknowledge the prior debt, but absent new consideration, the acknowledgement did not create fresh contractual obligation.
